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ABSTRACT
This Essay, written for a festschrift celebrating the career and contributions of Stephen Burbank, grapples with
the procedural implications of the steady advance of digital legal technologies, or “legal tech,” within the civil
justice system. From AI-fired tools that perform e-discovery and predict case outcomes to the migration from inperson to “virtual” proceedings accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic, few would disagree that civil litigation
in 2030 will look different than it did at the start of 2020. Proceeding from this core insight, this Essay sketches
two types of procedural reckonings that lie ahead as new digital technologies move from the periphery to the center
of the civil justice system. One I call traffic rules—rules that determine how and when parties are moved from inperson court proceedings to new online fora. Second are information rules that govern the availability, exchange,
and use of information in a fast-digitizing litigation system that will produce more and more of it, but often in
unevenly distributed ways. At least initially, and for reasons Professor Burbank has long identified, the process of
adapting analog versions of these traffic and information rules to a digital world is likely to remain the province of
judges, particularly trial judges operating within the considerable pools of discretion American procedure affords
them. But in time, digitization will place significant pressure on American ways of procedure-making. As judges
decide how much to weigh party consent in moving parties online, which machine outputs are protected work
product, or which cases to push to online dispute resolution (ODR) platforms and with what algorithmic tools to
inform parties about their likely prospects in court, the question will be whether judges can tailor old rules to new
digital contexts or whether more sweeping changes to those rules, or even entirely new governance and oversight
regimes, might be warranted. In making these decisions, judges—and, in time, rulemakers and legislators—will
help chart the digital future of the civil justice system.
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INTRODUCTION
“Crisis rhetoric” has long pervaded debate over American civil procedure.1
But amidst the hue and cry, a small set of voices has broken through,
rigorously but passionately excavating the deep structure of American
procedure-making. That group’s unrivaled leader is Steve Burbank. No
scholar has done more to map the tectonics of the system—its explicit and
implicit siting of discretion, its separation of powers subtleties, and its
capacity (some would say incapacity) for empirically informed judgment
about the consequences of rule choices. More importantly, no single
scholarly voice offers a better springboard for thinking about what the next
era of civil procedure might hold. And it is precisely clear-eyed thinking that
is needed now, as a potent new force enters the stage: the steady advance of
digital legal technologies, or “legal tech” for short, within the civil justice
system. From AI-fired tools that perform e-discovery and predict case
outcomes to the migration from in-person court proceedings to “virtual”
ones accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic, few would disagree that civil
litigation in 2030 will look different from civil litigation at the start of 2020.
Lawyers, judges, and academics should begin thinking about how the civil
justice system will change—and how civil procedure and its study may need
to adapt in response.
This Essay argues that the digitization of the civil justice system will be
particularly fraught because of a dynamic that has come to preoccupy a new
generation of procedure scholars, but one that Professor Burbank has
articulated and analyzed for decades. In a procedural system committed to
transsubstantive, “general” rules and run through with anxieties about
substance-specific procedure, decision-making discretion that accounts for
modern litigation’s multitudinous forms must be injected back into the
system somewhere. And that means judges, and more specifically trial judges,
get to make it up as they go.2 Whether pervasive judicial discretion is a good

1
2

Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects for Procedural Progress, 59 BROOK. L. REV.
762, 819–21 (1993).
The best overall statement, by Professor Burbank, is worth citing at length:
It is not surprising that, with some notable exceptions, the trend of modern procedural
law has been away from rules that make policy choices towards those that confer on trial
courts a substantial amount of normative discretion. For once one has settled upon transsubstantive rules as the best way of achieving uniformity, simplicity and predictability, and
once one acknowledges the impact of procedure on the substantive law, concerns about
either the legitimacy of the enterprise or its efficacy push in that direction. Moreover, in a
system dominated, as modern American procedure has been dominated, by equity, the
avoidance of prospective policy choices holds the promise that justice may be done, with
procedure its servant rather than master.
Federal Rules that avoid policy choices and that in essence chart ad hoc decisionmaking by trial judges are uniform and hence trans-substantive in only the most trivial
sense.
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thing or bad thing—and opinion runs the gamut3—large swathes of
American procedure have become a common law enterprise or even
improvisational and “ad hoc,” fit to purpose for a particular case, with little
appellate oversight at the back end.4
Proceeding from this core insight, this Essay sketches two types of rule
reckonings that lie ahead as new digital technologies move from the
periphery to the heart of the civil justice system. One I call traffic rules—rules
that determine how and when parties are moved from in-person court
proceedings to new online fora. Second are information rules that govern the
exchange of information in a rapidly digitizing litigation system that will
produce more and more of it, from e-discovery to case outcome predictions,
but often in unevenly distributed ways. At least initially, and for reasons
Professor Burbank has long identified, the process of adapting analog
versions of these traffic and information rules to a digital world is likely to
remain the province of judges, particularly trial judges, operating within the
considerable pools of discretion afforded them by American procedure. But
in time, digitization will place significant pressure on American ways of
procedure-making. As judges decide how much to weigh party consent in
moving parties online, which machine outputs are protected work product,
or which cases to push to online dispute resolution (ODR) platforms and with
what algorithmic tools to inform parties about their likely prospects in court
to facilitate settlement, the question will be whether judges can tailor existing

3

4

Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and Common Law, 63
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 715 (1988) (footnotes omitted).
Compare Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the
Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 2083–85 (1989)
(defending judicial discretion), with Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural
Discretion, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 1986 (2007) (noting judicial discretion’s failings, from
bounded rationality and information asymmetries to “strategic interaction effects”). For a classic
account of judicial discretion, see generally Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court,
Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635 (1971).
In addition to Of Rules and Discretion, see Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil
Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1929 (1989) [hereinafter Burbank, The
Transformation of Civil Procedure] (“The Federal Rules may appear uniform, but many of them merely
empower district judges to make ad hoc decisions.”), and Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of
Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1474 (1987) (reviewing RICHARD L. MARCUS & EDWARD F.
SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE
(1st ed. 1985)) (“Many of the Federal Rules authorize essentially ad hoc decisions and therefore are
trans-substantive in only the most trivial sense.”). For a sampling of a newer generation of scholars
navigating these waters, see Pamela K. Bookman & David L. Noll, Ad Hoc Procedure, 92 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 767 (2017), Nora Freeman Engstrom, The Lessons of Lone Pine, 129 YALE L.J. 2 (2019), Shirin
Sinnar, Procedural Experimentation and National Security in the Courts, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 991 (2018),
Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The Managerial Judge Goes to Trial, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 1261 (2010), and
Alexandra D. Lahav, Procedural Design, 71 VAND. L. REV. 821 (2018).
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rules to new digital contexts or whether more sweeping changes to the rules,
or even entirely new governance and oversight regimes, might be warranted.
In making these decisions, judges—and, in time, rulemakers and
legislators—will help chart the digital future of the civil justice system.
As we contend with these rule reckonings and usher in a new digital civil
procedure, there is no better guide than Professor Burbank and no better
example than his magisterial body of scholarship. To read that work is to
enroll in a master class in the great vectors of American procedure:
discretion, power, complexity, and transsubstantivity. Those contributions
alone would be the envy of any legal scholar. But to stop there would
drastically shortchange the breadth and depth of his contributions. For one
can also read his work as an extended methodological exhortation.
Sometimes, this took the form of old-fashioned spadework in primary
sources. Faced with a towering, elegant, and altogether Ely-esque account of
the Rules Enabling Act,5 Burbank replied with a 180-page excavation of the
Act’s decades long gestation and decisively showed its primary purpose was
to allocate power prospectively between Court and Congress, not to protect
past lawmaking or state substantive law.6 Roll up your sleeves, his work
announced, and you get to places that raw intellect and a powerful pen alone
cannot. No less important has been his exemplary efforts, without formal
methods training, to embrace harder-edged empiricism. Amidst growing but
largely anecdotal concern about American procedure-making, Burbank,
working with Sean Farhang, popped the hood and offered a superhumanly
rigorous accounting of the engine of its three main institutional actors:
Advisory Committee, Court, and Congress.7 Many proceduralists, of course,
have called for an empirical turn in research, most famously Geoffrey
Hazard back in 1963 as behavioralist social science gathered steam.8 But
5
6
7
8

John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693 (1974).
Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1025, 1106 (1982) (noting
the Enabling Act’s core “equable division” purpose) [hereinafter Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act].
STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: THE
COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION 19 (2017).
See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., RESEARCH IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 3 (1963) (describing the state of
procedural research at the time as “groping in a fog”). Hazard, of course, is not the only example.
The Pound Conference in 1906 featured such calls. See Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON
JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 337 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979). And those calls have
continued. See Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute
Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 366, 367 (1986) (“Lawyers, including
judges and law professors, have been lazy about subjecting their hunches—which in honesty we
should admit are often little better than prejudices—to systematic empirical testing.”); Marc
Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1155 (1996) (“A fund of
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Professor Burbank has done more than make empirical calls. Leading by
example, he has embodied them. As with his work on the Enabling Act’s
origins, sweat equity, not cheap talk, defines his scholarship.
It’s at that intersection—a deep understanding of power and discretion,
on the one hand; methodological innovation, on the other—that rests the
future of civil procedure as new technologies sweep into the system.
Digitization of litigation will press on all of the tensions in American
procedure-making that Professor Burbank has charted. It will enflame
separation of powers conflict. It will open up new and worrying distributive
dynamics. It will defy American procedure’s claims to neutrality and its
bracketing of resource asymmetries at the altar of adversarialism. It will
generate litigation alternatives that further erode the monopoly position of
judge and court and test our commitment to public deliberative exercises and
reason giving. And it will test the system’s ability to make empirical
judgments even as it creates oceans of new data that require new methods to
unpack and interrogate. Most important of all, it will bring sustained and
powerful pressure on the key questions at the heart of Professor Burbank’s
scholarly work: not just what the rules should be, but who gets to make them.
It is hard to imagine a more fitting forum, or a better way to begin to think
through these questions as litigation enters the digital era, than a celebration
of Professor Burbank’s inspired leadership as a lawyer and legal scholar on
each of these fronts.
The remainder of this Essay proceeds as follows. Part I describes where
American procedure has been, as masterfully surveyed by Professor Burbank.
Part II looks to the future and describes two types of rule reckonings, across
three new contexts, that lie ahead in a rapidly digitizing litigation system. Part
III steps back and asks what role procedure scholars might play as those
reckonings sort out, returning once more to Professor Burbank’s field-shaping
leadership as a guide.
I. DISCRETION, POWER, AND METHOD IN CIVIL PROCEDURE
To think about where American procedure might go in a fast-digitizing
litigation system, one must first take stock of where it has been and where it
currently sits. A trio of slow-moving but powerful tectonic trends—deepening

basic information about the working of our legal institutions, of a sort that we take for granted in
discussions of the economy, or health care, or education, simply does not exist.”); David Freeman
Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study of Civil Procedure, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1203, 1204
(2013) (calling for more rigorous research about the effect of Twombly’s plausibility pleading regime).
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judicial discretion, procedure’s steady politicization, and increasing but still
imperfect empirical transparency over the system’s workings—have defined
the last century of American procedure, and Professor Burbank has
brilliantly mapped each.
A. Judicial Discretion
First and foremost are growing pools of judicial discretion. Some of this
expansion has come in the clear light of day, in marquee Supreme Court
decisions expanding the role of dispositive motions: first summary judgment,
blessed in the Court’s 1986 Celotex trilogy,9 then motions to dismiss via the
advent of plausibility pleading in Twombly and Iqbal.10 Some of it has taken
more diffuse and less tractable forms. Managerial judging, once bitterly
debated, has become the norm in complex litigations, buoyed by
amendments to Rule 16 and 26 giving judges substantial control over the
pacing, sequencing, and settlement of litigation.11 Deepening pools of judicial
discretion have also spilled into the exotic. Nearly all of the devices that have
evolved in multidistrict litigation (MDL), from plaintiff steering committees
to bellwether trials to Lone Pine orders, are nowhere authorized by rule or
statute and rarely subject to meaningful appellate review.12
But the trend toward judicial discretion is no less evident beyond the elite
precincts of mass torts MDLs or antitrust class actions, in the smaller-bore,
workaday litigation contexts that make up the bulk of the work of American
courts. A good example comes in judicial treatment of pro se litigants—a
burning issue arising out the staggering fact that, in three-quarters of the

9
10
11

12

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254–55 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 327 (1986); and Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 596–97 (1986).
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–
80 (2009).
For a classic account, see Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).
Managerial judgment has spilled over into trial too. See Thornburg, supra note 4, at 1261–62 (“[T]he
philosophy underlying managerial judging has expanded into the trial phase . . . .”); Nora Freeman
Engstrom, The Trouble with Trial Time Limits, 106 GEO. L.J. 933, 937 (2018) (arguing that Judith
Resnick’s “managerial thesis” has expanded to include the trial period).
See, e.g., Engstrom, supra note 4, at 44 (“A trial judge can use a Lone Pine order to terminate a case
while insulating herself from meaningful appellate review.”); David L. Noll, MDL as Public
Administration, 118 MICH. L. REV. 403, 422 (“Many decisions in MDL are effectively immune from
appellate review.”) (2019); Abbe R. Gluck, Unorthodox Civil Procedure: Modern Multidistrict Litigation’s
Place in the Textbook Understandings of Procedure, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1669, 1688–89 (2017) (noting that
MDLs are an example of “procedural exceptionalism,” as there is no Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure specific to MDLs, and the MDL statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1407, concerns when MDLs are
authorized but does not mention the procedures, from bellwether trials to plaintiff steering
committees, that judges deploy for case management and resolution).

2184

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 23:6

millions of civil cases filed in state courts each year, at least one party is
unrepresented.13 A growing literature catalogs the varying ways judges
manage this pro se parade, particularly the degree to which they adopt a more
active inquisitorial posture or a more passive and adversarial one, with little
guidance or rules structuring that choice.14
Caveats apply. Judicial discretion’s ascension has hardly been straight
line. Going all the way back to 1938, the merger of equity and law
constrained some of the open-ended discretion of the former.15 More
recently, the rise of private procedural ordering has narrowed judicial
discretion and power outside of a designated “core” of procedure said to sit
beyond the power of parties to change.16 For instance, party control over
forum selection has plainly increased, and judicial discretion curtailed, both
inside the court system, via the presumptive validity of forum selection
clauses,17 and outside of it, via the presumptive enforceability of arbitration
clauses.18 Finally, key areas of procedure, particularly discovery, are perhaps
best characterized as within mutual party control, with judicial discretion
13

14

15

16

17

18

Paula Hannaford-Agor, Scott Graves, & Shelley Spacek Miller, THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL
LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., at iv, vi, 32 (2015), https://
www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/13376/civiljusticereport-2015.pdf [https://
perma.cc/E3CZ-HRJQ]. Pro se rates in federal court are roughly twenty-five to thirty percent. See
Mark D. Gough & Emily S. Taylor Poppe, (Un)Changing Rates of Pro Se Litigation in Federal Court, 45
LAW & SOC. INQ. 567, 574–75 (2020).
Anna E. Carpenter, Jessica K. Steinberg, Colleen F. Shanahan & Alyx Mark, Studying the “New”
Civil Judges, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 249, 252–53 (2018); Jessica K. Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown and
Judicial Role Confusion in “Small Case” Civil Justice, 2016 BYU L. REV. 899, 903 (2016); Anna E.
Carpenter, Active Judging and Access to Justice, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 647, 651, 655–56 (2017).
Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Procedure in Historical
Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 975–82, 1000–03 (1987); AMALIA D. KESSLER, INVENTING
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN ADVERSARIAL LEGAL CULTURE,
1800–1877, at 9 (2017).
See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules Through Party Choice, 90 TEX. L.
REV. 1329, 1382 (2012); Jaime Dodge, The Limits of Procedural Private Ordering, 97 VA. L. REV. 723,
783–85 (2011); Michael L. Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The Case for Making Civil Procedure Negotiable,
75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 461, 467–91 (2007); Scott Dodson, Party Subordinance in Federal Litigation, 83
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 37 (2014); Robert J. Rhee, Toward Procedural Optionality: Private Ordering of
Public Adjudication, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514, 570 (2009). Interestingly, because the overwhelming
majority of state court litigants are unrepresented, privatized procedure (beyond arbitration clauses)
is more a federal-level phenomenon. See Anna E. Carpenter, Jessica Steinberg, Colleen F.
Shanahan & Alyx Mark, Judges and the Deregulation of the Lawyer’s Monopoly, 80 FORDHAM L. REV.
1315, 1315–17 (making this point).
See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593–95 (1991); Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v.
U.S. Dist. Ct., 571 U.S. 49, 63–66 (2013). For an analysis of how Atlantic Marine swept away judicial
discretion to consider private interest factors under § 1404(a) in cases with forum selection clauses,
see Scott Dodson, Atlantic Marine and the Future of Party Preference, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 675, 677 (2015).
See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344–45, 352 (2011); Epic Sys. Corp. v.
Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619, 1621–22 (2018).
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entering the mix only episodically, when disputes arise.19 Still, each of these
areas is dwarfed by the far more numerous procedures, beginning with
dispositive motions and MDLs but extending well beyond, where judges have
accrued vast authority as final procedural arbiters: service of process, filing
deadlines, consolidation and separation of actions, attorney misconduct,
interlocutory appeals, class settlements, new trials, and the core pacing and
sequencing of litigation. Few could disagree that, on net, the story of nearly
a century of American procedure has been the steady accretion of judicial
discretion at the expense of lawyers, litigants, juries, and rulemakers.
Why this has happened is a harder question, but two explanations stand
out. Some (including Professor Burbank) would say it was cooked from the
start, the inevitable result of the system’s foundational transprocedural
commitments: that “general” rules should be uniformly applicable across
courts and cases and that those rules can only be made or changed through
the Enabling Act process.20 Of course, uniformly applied rules bring benefits,
among them a stable backdrop against which Congress and President can
legislate substance.21 But there are consequences. Because departures from
general and uniform rules are disfavored or even prohibited and raise
troubling questions of institutional power and legitimacy, the only way to
account for modern litigation’s many forms, and the only way around a
hopeless and ineffectual formalism, is judicial discretion.
Institutional fragmentation has also contributed. In public choice terms,
judges may be the least fragmented of the power players. As political
polarization has plunged Congress into dysfunction and gridlock, and as the
legal profession has become ever more specialized and balkanized,22 only

19

20
21
22

For a careful recent analysis and a review of this literature, see generally Robin J. Effron, Ousted:
The New Dynamics of Privatized Procedure and Judicial Discretion, 98 B.U. L. REV. 127 (2018). For a
classic statement of American adversarialism, see John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil
Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 830 (1985) that compares the German procedural system to an
Anglo-American procedure built on “partisan presentation of evidence to a passive and ignorant
trier.”
See Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading the Dilemmas of “General Rules”, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 535, 536 (2009)
[Burbank, “General Rules”].
David Marcus, Trans-Substantivity and the Processes of American Law, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1191, 1211,
1235 (2013).
As Burbank showed, the diversification and specialization not only shrank the community of
interest among lawyers, but also ensured that the views of bench and bar on key procedural matters
would diverge as well. Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of Congress, 79
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1677, 1720 (2004) [hereinafter Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power] (“[T]he
legal profession became less homogeneous, more competitive, and more specialized, and the
communities of interest among lawyers and between lawyers and judges shrank.”); Stephen B.
Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: A Call for a Moratorium, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 841, 853
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judges, with their relative homogeneity, political insulation, and streamlined
decision processes and simple majority rules, can put up something like a
united front.23
Importantly, judges and judicial discretion win out even when other
stakeholders rise up. In the great procedure battles of the 1980s and 1990s,
Congress was wrested from its slumber on procedural matters when lawyers,
enraged by the Advisory Committee’s “cavalier” and unempirical
“tinkerings”24 with Rule 11 and Rule 26, learned to pull legislative “fire
alarms.”25 In turn, legislators learned that procedure is power.26 The twin
result has been increasing legislative pushback in the rulemaking process27
and legislative incursions, from the silo-specific Prison Litigation Reform Act
and Private Securities Litigation Reform to the more transsubstantive Civil
Justice Reform Act and Class Action Fairness Act.28 To be sure,
congressional meddling has at times cabined judicial discretion. But judges
have, on net, benefitted from separation of powers struggles. Conflict
between Congress and rulemakers led to the opening up of the rulemaking

23

24
25

26

27

28

(1993) [hereinafter Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform] (“[I]t may no longer make sense to
talk about the legal profession in connection with procedural reform.”); Stephen B. Burbank,
Procedure and Power, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 513, 514 (1996) [hereinafter Burbank, Procedure and Power]
(noting legal profession at time of 1938 rules was “small and homogeneous, or at least was a
recognizable profession”).
This is not to say that courts are entirely insulated. See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE
PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE
MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 367–68 (1st ed. 2009).
Stephen B. Burbank & Linda J. Silberman, Civil Procedure Reform in Comparative Context: The United
States of America, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 675, 680 (1997).
Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power, supra note 22, at 1704 (“[L]awyers, members of an increasingly
diverse and fragmented (through specialization and competition) profession, came to believe that
the rulemakers (who had come to be dominated by judges) were not listening, and they turned to
Congress for relief from proposals to which they objected.”); id. at 1722 (“The risk of a rupture
between federal judges and the bar was realized when, in response to a perceived crisis of expense
and delay, judges pursued rulemaking strategies that either empowered them at the expense of
lawyers and their clients (sanctions and active case management) or that simply disempowered
lawyers (discovery reform).”).
In particular, Congress sought to reassert their authority and move the system toward one that
more closely approximates delegated legislative power than “inherent” judicial power. See id. at
1705 (“[L]obbying by lawyers and others led members of Congress to perceive that some issues of
court practice and procedure either could be used to generate political support among certain
interest groups or in any event might require attention in order to preserve such support.”); id. at
1679-89.
Witness, for instance, Congress’s pushback against the Federal Rules of Evidence or proposed
procedural amendments in 1983 and 1993. See Stephen B. Burbank, Implementing Procedural Change:
Who, How, Why, and When?, 49 ALA. L. REV. 221, 228 (1997) [hereinafter, Burbank, Implementing
Procedural Change] (recounting growing “power struggles” around FRE, Rule 11, and CJRA).
See Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power, supra note 22, at 1693–1703.
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process in 1988 and its assimilation to administrative law’s notice-andcomment model.29 While some say this change pressed the rulemakers into
narrower and more technocratic poses, it may have also had the larger effect
of delegitimating rulemaking by rendering it little different, at least viewed
from the outside, from the pull and haul of “normal” politics.30
B. Procedure and Power
Underwriting each of these explanations for growing pools of judicial
discretion is the second great tectonic trend of the last century of American
procedure, and another one that has benefited from Professor Burbank’s
masterful analysis: a fundamental shift in the civil justice landscape, rooted
in the growing American reliance on courts and litigation to make and
implement social policies.
Once again, there are high and low precincts. The usual high precinct
version of the story, anchored by the groundbreaking scholarly work of
Robert Kagan, Sean Farhang, and Professor Burbank, is that the American
political system has increasingly turned to private enforcement to
compensate individuals for wrongs and enforce key social norms.31 The
American reliance on litigation, on this account, is not a runaway result of
lawyer avarice or a “victim society,” as some would have it.32 It is a deliberate
legislative regulatory choice. Whatever the relative contribution of these
various potential causes, note the effect: the deepening role of litigation as a
vehicle of American social policymaking has steadily sharpened anxieties
about substance-specific rulemaking by continually raising the specter that
judicially chosen procedures are altering legislative bargains. Battles over
29
30

31

32

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–74.
See Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform, supra note 22, at 849–50 (1993) (arguing that, far
from helping Congress to disengage on procedural matters, rulemaking’s new guise may have
encouraged legislators “to second-guess the product of that process or to preempt it”); see also
Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power, supra note 22, at 1724 (“[T]he changes in the rulemaking
process in the 1980s that were designed to open it up to more and more diverse points of view,
make it more transparent, and diminish the need for congressional involvement, may in fact have
facilitated a process of redundancy wherein participants treat rulemaking that is at all controversial
as merely the first act.”).
See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 39 (2d ed. 2019)
(explaining the American penchant for court- and litigation-centered regulatory approaches). See
generally SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE
LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. (2010) (explaining the post-war American turn to litigation and its
consequences).
See, e.g., WALTER OLSEN, THE EXCUSE FACTORY: HOW EMPLOYMENT LAW IS PARALYZING THE
AMERICAN WORKPLACE (1997); KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF VICTIMS (1992); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE (1985).
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Rule 11 and Rule 26 might have gotten lawyers’ backs up and helped
Congress to see political power and advantage in procedure. Beneath it all,
however, is a slower burn of politicization of procedure born of the American
turn to private attorneys general in key—hotly contested—regulatory
battlegrounds.
The lower-precinct version of the story often gets lost in accounts of the
postwar litigation turn, but it is no less important. As economic inequality
has widened and poverty deepened, a different kind of social policymaking
has been judicialized. American courts have become de facto social welfare
bureaucracies—perennially flooded by a tsunami of consumer debt, eviction,
and family law cases, but without the governance tools or staffs that agencies
sitting in the other branches of government can tap to manage them.33
Importantly, this lower-precinct trend is connected to the higher-precinct
one by more than just the judicialization of social policy. Indeed,
judicialization of the high sort has helped create the conditions that afflict the
low sort. In a system committed to general rules, the elaboration of a rich set
of procedures to handle “complex” litigation in high-stakes policy areas has
steadily priced many litigants out of the market for legal services elsewhere
in the system. PeopleLaw—the segment of the legal services industry that
represents individuals, as compared to BigLaw’s entity-focused practice—has
steadily shrunk.34 While access-to-justice advocates clamor for simplified
procedures to lower the cost of legal representation and allow litigants to go
it alone, the system’s transprocedural impulse and the growing complexity of
big-ticket litigation has pushed the system in the other direction, yielding a
costly menu of Cadillac procedures that apply even in cases where a Ford
might do.35
There remain, of course, important debates about the causes of the
American resort to courts and litigation compared to other advanced
democracies.36 Likewise there are hard questions about the shape and success
33

34

35
36

For a powerful statement, see Colleen F. Shanahan & Anna E. Carpenter, Simplified Courts Can’t
Solve Inequality, 148 DAEDULUS 128, 128, 129–30 (2019). See also Colleen F. Shanahan, Alyx Mark,
Jessica K. Steinberg & Anna E. Carpenter, COVID, Crisis, and Courts, 99 TEX. L. REV. ONLINE 10,
11 (2020) (“Even before the pandemic, as other branches of government failed to address inequality,
state civil courts became the government actor of last resort for the tens of millions of American
each year who suffer the consequences of these failures.”).
Bill Henderson, The Decline of the PeopleLaw Sector (037), LEGAL EVOLUTION (Nov. 19, 2017),
https://www.legalevolution.org/2017/11/decline-peoplelaw-sector-037 [https://perma.cc/JV7DK2KN].
See Burbank, “General Rules”, supra note 20, at 563.
See David Freeman Engstrom & David Hausman, Rights, Redistribution, and the Rise of the “Litigation
State”: The Case of Disability Discrimination, 46 LAW & SOC. INQ. 788, 788–91 (2021).
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of the more recent anti-litigation “counter-revolution” that has sought to
reverse and retrench the American turn to litigation.37 For Professor
Burbank, retrenchment efforts exhibit a baleful mix of abdication and
fecklessness: credulous rulemakers who have bought into an empirically
shaky narrative about “cost and delay” in litigation; feckless legislators who
have caved to powerful incentives to submerge unpopular policies in
litigation-squelching statutory procedures while refusing to provide
alternative policy vehicles, be it social insurance or agency enforcement;38
and a cynical Supreme Court that uses decisional law to amend rules (though
disclaims doing so) knowing that procedural arcana will fly below the public
radar.39 While some might disagree with one or more of these Burbank-ian
broadsides, a larger point seems undeniable: litigation’s centrality in
American policymaking means that procedure will, for the foreseeable
future, remain a lightning rod—one of the foremost battlegrounds in
America politics, even if many of the key battles play out behind the scenes.
C. Empirical Method
A third and final tectonic change that is central to any high-level
accounting of the past and present of American procedure—and yet another
place where Professor Burbank has done invaluable, field-shaping work—is
the growing store of empirical knowledge about the system’s workings and
effects. As with the other tectonic moves in American procedure, this trend
has been jagged rather than straight. Indeed, perhaps more so than the
others, it is as much a perennial challenge as a chartable trend. Still, the
steady refinement of empirical methods, the flowering of “empirical legal
studies,” and the growing digitization and datafication of courts and litigation
have generated ever-greater, though far from perfect, transparency over the
workings of the system and the consequences of procedural choices.
Yet procedure’s empirical turn has been a double-edged sword. Knowing
forum shopping’s effect on case outcomes,40 or Rule 11’s actual deployment

37

38
39
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See generally BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 7 (2017); Stephen B. Burbank, Reconsidering Judicial
Independence: Forty–Five Years in the Trenches and in the Tower, 168 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 18, 29–34
(2019) [hereinafter Burbank, Reconsidering Judicial Independence].
See Burbank, “General Rules,” supra note 20, at 560–64.
BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 7, at 22–23; see also Burbank, Reconsidering Judicial Independence,
supra note 37, at 31–32.
See William H.J. Hubbard, An Empirical Study of the Effect of Shady Grove v. Allstate on Forum Shopping
in the New York Courts, 10 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 151, 156–57 (2013) (reviewing empirical studies of
forum shopping).
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rate,41 or that Twombly has affected certain cases more than others42 makes
for better rules. Empirical validation of rule choices can also protect
rulemakers from political incursions by allowing them to maintain the mantle
of expertise and objectivity and avoid the perception, just noted, that their
work is merely an extension of “normal” politics.43
Empiricism, however, brings as much peril as promise. Most obviously,
a growing store of empirical knowledge creates problems when rulemakers
ignore it.44 Litigation empirics are also just plain hard. Data is spotty.45
Pervasive selection dynamics mean that much of what passes for empiricism
may not be worth the paper it is written on.46 The stickiness of legal culture
further complicates rigorous inferences even with water-tight research
designs. The problem, as Professor Burbank once noted in the context of the
CJRA, is the lengthy time-horizons of quality research, since a procedure’s
long-run effects cannot be captured until bench and bar have grown
comfortable with the new way of doing things.47 Finally, litigation empiricism
is hard in the American system because the commitment to general rules
disfavors “bottom up” solutions and so forecloses robust local
experimentation—perhaps the best source of variation on which to base
rigorous causal inferences about the impacts of rule choices.48
41
42

43
44

45

46
47
48

SAUL M. KASSIN, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS, at ix–xi (1985); Carl Tobias,
Civil Rights Plaintiffs and The Proposed Revision of Rule 11, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1775, 1776–77 (1992).
See Jonah B. Gelbach, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of Twombly and Iqbal on Access
to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270, 2273–78 (2012); Jonah B. Gelbach, Material Facts in the Debate over
Twombly and Iqbal, 68 STAN. L. REV. 369, 376 (2016). See generally Engstrom, supra note 8
(summarizing and critiquing the quantitative research scholars have completed on the effects of
Twiqbal).
Marc Galanter, Bryant Garth, Deborah Hensler & Frances Kahn Zemans, How to Improve Civil
Justice Policy, 77 JUDICATURE 185, 185, 230 (1994).
The Advisory Committee “studied indifference to empirical questions” in ramming through
changes to Rule 11 and Rule 26 did more than wake Congress from its 50-year slumber on
procedure. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform, supra note 22, at 841. The Advisory
Committee also lost the policymaking high ground at a key moment, when the opening up of
rulemaking to public view was already subtly eroding its legitimacy. Burbank, The Transformation of
American Civil Procedure, supra note 4, at 1950.
See Nora Freeman Engstrom, The Diminished Trial, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2131, 2139–40 (2018)
(reviewing data issues); Herbert M. Kritzer, The Trials and Tribulations of Counting “Trials”, 62
DEPAUL L. REV. 415, 436 (2013).
See Engstrom, supra note 8, at 1206; Gelbach, Material Facts in the Debate over Twombly and Iqbal,
supra note 42, at 376.
Burbank, Implementing Procedural Change, supra note 27, at 241.
The best example is the CJRA, which committed to local, “bottom up” solutions rather than
national, “top down” solutions as the best way to make progress on perceived problems of expense
and delay, requiring each district to develop a plan. However, this created considerable tension
between national and local rulemaking, pitting the promise of new and creative solutions against
the perceived hit to uniformity and predictability. See Burbank & Silberman, supra note 24, at 680
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There are, however, two further ways in which procedure’s empirical
turn has impacted American procedure-making. The first has come from
Professor Burbank himself, in his impressive recent scholarly work, noted
previously, laying bare the inner workings of federal-level rulemaking. That
analysis showed that the rulemaker ranks have become increasingly heavy
on Republican-nominated judges and defense lawyers and that the valence
of the Advisory Committee’s work—the amendments it proposes and
pursues—has followed accordingly.49 Time will tell the impact of this
unmasking of a process whose legitimacy was already taking hits, but it is
unlikely to be good.
The second effect of procedure’s empirical turn runs deeper and exposes
a final peril in a system committed to general, substance-agnostic rules.
However incomplete, increased empirical transparency over litigation brings
with it an ability to gauge a rule’s substantive effects, pressing the entire
rulemaking enterprise into a perpetual, low-grade conflict with the system’s
transprocedural commitments and, more pointedly, the Enabling Act’s
antimodification mandate. As Professor Burbank’s seminal excavation of the
Enabling Act showed, its drafters imagined a line between Congress and
Court that placed off-limits to court supervisory rulemaking anything that has
a “predictable and identifiable effect” on the rights of person or property.50
Note, however, the catch-22 in an era of increasing empirical transparency:
an allocation standard keyed to the predictability of a rule’s impact would
limit court supervisory rulemaking to zones of irrelevance or speculation,
where the effects of rule changes are either negligible or empirically muddy.
Once we know that the 1993 version of Rule 11 kneecaps particular types of
plaintiffs, or that Twombly has a more robust effect on civil rights cases, both
Rule 11 and Twombly become, in a sense, substance-specific. The myth of
transsubstantivity and the legitimacy of American procedure-making, in other
words, rests at least in part on the system’s continuing opacity.
* * *

49
50

(1997). Worse, the CJRA adopted a “bottom up” approach at the same time that the federal
judiciary, with Congress’s encouragement, was doing just the opposite: disciplining and narrowing
local-level disuniformity. Burbank, Implementing Procedural Change, supra note 27, at 230. Burbank’s
warning about the “temptation to make [difficult] choices in local rules” reflected a more general
unease with local experimentation that continues to haunt the system. Burbank, Ignorance and
Procedural Law Reform, supra note 22, at 854. For an overview of the CJRA and its short-lived localist
impulse, see Lauren Robel, Fractured Procedure: The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 46 STAN. L. REV.
1447, 1450–54 (1994).
See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 7, at 19–20.
See Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act, supra note 6, at 1114; see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 476
(1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (defining substantive as affecting “primary conduct”).
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Plenty will disagree with some of these particulars. Some will say it paints
too morose a portrait of the state of American procedure-making. Sure,
rulemakers have ignored empirical evidence. Sure, legislators have buried
social policy choices in statutory procedure without providing substitute
entitlements or enforcement capacity. And sure, courts have not always
owned up to their use of decisional law to amend procedural rules outside of
rulemaking. But all of this, one could argue, falls well short of abdication or
fecklessness. Rather, it is the usual mix of principle and institutional selfinterest that characterizes any complex policymaking system.
Others, however, will say it is not morose enough. From the vantage of
the 1990s, one could imagine Court and Congress, or Advisory Committee
and congressional committees, carving out a healthy, interbranch
cooperation on civil justice matters—a new “treaty” on procedure-making of
the sort Professor Burbank and others once called for.51 From the vantage of
2021, however, appeals to “cooperation,” “genuine dialogue,” and “restraint
in assertions about power, prerogatives, and competence”52 ring hollow and
even naïve—a patrician’s call for civility as revolutionaries build barricades.
Far from a shared vision, nowadays it is all institutional fracture, with rules
pushed to their “hardball” maximum, the norms that sanded down their
sharp edges be damned, and a growing political polarization and nihilism
that preclude serious lawmaking and, worse for courts, have yielded a
dysfunctional and perhaps unsalvageable judicial selection process.53
But one need not be an apologist or alarmist to see the kernel of truth in
the basic story just told. American law’s transprocedural impulse, the
narrowing and delegitimation of court supervisory rulemaking, a bitterly
polarized and dysfunctional politics, and substantial shifts in the shape of the
51

52
53

See Burbank, Procedure and Power, supra note 22, at 517 (calling for Rules Enabling Act of 1998 in
which the judiciary would “resume its primacy in civil justice reform but contemplates that the
branches will cooperate, with the judiciary taking the lead, in the formulation and promulgation of
reforms that would necessarily and obviously affect substantive rights”; the Act would also make “a
national commitment to civil justice research” and “tighten[] national control on local procedural
experimentation”); Burbank & Silberman, supra note 24, at 703–04 (1997) (imagining a world in
which “unilateral action [gives] way to pursuit of a shared vision, one that is informed by the fruits
of empirical inquiry or an appropriate surrogate, disciplined by awareness of that which is politically
feasible and crafted with technical expertise”). For other explorations, see Galanter et al., supra note
43, and Charles Gardner Geyh, Paradise Lost, Paradigm Found: Redefining the Judiciary’s Imperiled Role in
Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1234–40 (1996) (calling for an Interbranch Commission on Law
Reform and the Judiciary).
Burbank, Implementing Procedural Change, supra note 27, at 222.
See Richard L. Hasen, Polarization and the Judiciary, 22 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 261, 262 (2019) (arguing
that increased polarization affects both judicial selection and litigation outcomes). See generally Joseph
Fishkin & David E. Pozen, Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 915 (2018).
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civil justice system and the legal services industry that serves it have yielded
ever deeper pools of judicial discretion in areas where justice is meted out in
some of its most significant forms, from sprawling MDLs and class actions in
federal courts to consumer debt collections and evictions at the state level.
Add to these dynamics a tighter empirical bead on the system’s workings and
the impact of rule choices, and you get a procedure-making process that is at
best embattled and at worst perpetually on the verge of crisis.
This, in turn, should be worrying because of the impending arrival of a
new tectonic force that seems likely to be every bit as important as the ones
that Professor Burbank has done so much to elucidate. A wave of digital legal
technologies is on the way and, in the years to come, will progressively move
to the center of the civil justice system. Tech is not something that Professor
Burbank much considered in his prodigious body of scholarship. But his
masterful mappings of the tectonics of a century of American procedure has
helped lay the groundwork for thinking about how civil procedure will
modulate legal tech’s continued advance and how judges, lawyers, and, in
particular, civil procedure scholars can help navigate that process.
II. THE LEGAL TECH CHALLENGE: RULE RECKONINGS
Ours is a technological age, and courts and litigation are no exception.
Indeed, lawyers, judges, academics, and entrepreneurs have begun to sketch
a portrait of a legal system that will be increasingly permeated by new digital
tools of various shapes and varieties—digitized litigation for a digitized era.
“Legal tech,” as some call it, is growing fast, though these tools defy quick
description.54 Various legal tech applications—e-discovery tools for
managing documents, back-office tools that automate billing, and web-based
marketing tools—have existed for decades. But legal tech’s most potent
current forms are unified by their reliance upon predictive analytics,
particularly machine learning, and it is here that we can expect the greatest
leaps forward as software increasingly performs advanced legal cognitions

54

The very notion of “technology” in law is hard to corral. Litigation finance is a technology, though
not a digital one, that is quietly remaking the civil justice system. So are alternative legal service
providers. And digital technologies in law come in different flavors. Some are proximate to, but not
“of,” the legal system. A good example is the ways social media could re-engineer aggregate
litigation by making possible a new, “participatory” class action founded upon voice, not exit. See
Elizabeth J. Cabraser & Samuel Issacharoff, The Participatory Class Action, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 846,
854, 856–57 (2017). Others are more directly involved in the provision of legal services or the
processing of cases. That is my focus in what follows.
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that supplement and, at times, supplant lawyers’ work.55 Lawyers will
increasingly rely on legal tech to review documents and make privilege calls,
predict case outcomes, and generate pleadings and papers. The
unrepresented, too, will benefit from the diffusion of technologies, from Q/A
systems offering legal advice to document assembly software, to help them
go it alone in court or resolve their disputes without engaging courts at all.56
But legal tech also includes technologies that are, comparatively speaking,
analog. The COVID-19 pandemic induced our normally hidebound courts
to move a nontrivial portion of the system online. Even as courthouse reopen
their doors in a post-COVID world, a significant amount of that digital
migration will stick.
The precise contours of this newly digitized litigation system are as yet
unclear. A lively debate has begun to sketch long-run concerns, many of
them explored via thought experiments around “robojudges” and
“robolawyers,”57 or even an eventual state of “legal singularity,” when
machines can perfectly predict the outcome of every case before it is filed.58
Along the way, potent new legal tech tools, we are told, will change law itself
by collapsing standards into rules and steadily shifting the jurisprudential
foundation of the system away from “equitable justice” and toward “codified
justice,” crowding out judicial discretion and values such as mercy or
extenuation.59 In its most bracing forms, speculation about the legal system’s
digital future holds that courthouses will cease to exist as physical places as
adjudication moves from courtrooms and law offices to server farms.60
But if we lower our gaze to a more useful and tractable middle distance,
and if we take healthy account of Professor Burbank’s masterful mappings of

55
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See DANIEL SUSSKIND, A WORLD WITHOUT WORK: TECHNOLOGY, AUTOMATION, AND HOW WE
SHOULD RESPOND 77–97 (2020) (describing “task encroachment” in the lawyering context).
See generally REBECCA L. SANDEFUR, AM. BAR FOUND., LEGAL TECH FOR NON-LAWYERS:
REPORT OF THE SURVEY OF U.S. LEGAL TECHNOLOGIES (2019).
See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Chief Justice Robots, 68 DUKE L.J. 1135, 1137–42 (2019); Milan Markovic,
Rise of the Robot Lawyers?, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 325, 349–50 (2019).
See Benjamin Alarie, The Path of the Law: Towards Legal Singularity, 66 U. TORONTO L.J. 443, 445–46
(2016).
For a jurisprudential overview, see Richard M. Re & Alicia Solow-Niederman, Developing Artificially
Intelligent Justice, 22 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 242 (2019). See also Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett,
The Death of Rules and Standards, 92 IND. L.J. 1401, 1403 (2017) (finding that technology removes the
trade-off between rules and standards).
See MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE & DANIEL N. ROCKMORE, Introduction: From Analogue to Digital Legal
Scholarship, in LAW AS DATA: COMPUTATION, TEXT, & THE FUTURE OF LEGAL ANALYSIS, at xiv
(Michael A. Livermore & Daniel N. Rockmore eds., 2019). The less grandiose version is Susskind’s
notion that adjudication will become a “service” rather than a “place.” See RICHARD SUSSKIND,
ONLINE COURTS AND THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE 95 (2019).
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the past century of American procedure, we can see a set of more concrete
rule reckonings ahead, each a site of conflict where there will be substantial
work for judges, rulemakers, lawyers, and procedure scholars to do. Some of
these rule reckonings will be relatively straightforward. For instance, in the
near term, we’ll confront key questions about the technical specifications for
online systems and rules prescribing how, precisely, online court proceedings
will be made available to the public in order to cash out the “open court”
provisions that pepper American constitutions, statutes, and rules.61
A pair of more challenging rule reckonings, however, will come in the
deep pools of judicial discretion created by our equity based system of
procedure. First are traffic rules that will govern entry into and exit from new
virtual fora—for instance, rules determining whether a case is heard in
person or online, and whether the judge, the parties, or neither get to make
that decision. Second are information rules that will govern the availability,
exchange, and use of the new troves of information generated by a rapidly
digitizing legal system. Examples include the proportionality and work
product rules that will govern the use of potent new software that performs
legal tasks, from e-discovery to outcome prediction, or rules governing
whether and how court-linked online dispute resolution (ODR) platforms
should arm disputants with data-based predictions about their prospects in
court to nudge them toward settlement.
Critical choices over this mix of traffic and information rules will
inaugurate a new digital era of American civil procedure, pressing on each
of the tectonic trends that have defined American procedure in recent
decades and placing particular pressure on a system of procedure-making
built around judicial discretion. This Part offers a taste of each.
A. Traffic Rules: “Virtual” Justice and the Migration Online
Start with a sweeping technological change that was already in motion
when the COVID-19 pandemic hit but exploded into view as infections
61

See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a) (“At trial, the witnesses’ testimony must be taken in open court unless a
federal statute, the Federal Rules of Evidence, these rules, or other rules adopted by the Supreme
Court provide otherwise.”); U.S. Const. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”). Numerous
state constitutions have “open court” clauses. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Hoffman, By the Course of the Law:
The Origins of the Open Courts Clause of State Constitutions, 74 OR. L. REV. 1279, 1279 (1995) (canvassing
the provisions). For a useful overview of the “open courts” doctrine, see Michael Pressman & Michael
Shammas, Memorandum: The Permissibility & Constitutionality of Jury Trial by Videoconference, CIV. JURY
PROJECT (May 4, 2020), https://civiljuryproject.law.nyu.edu/memorandum-the-permissibilityconstitutionality-of-jury-trial-by-videoconference [https://perma.cc/J9NC-SZB4].
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spread and courthouses shuttered: the migration of formal court proceedings
from in-person to online fora. The scale and scope of that process has been
stunning: since the pandemic began in March 2020, federal and state courts
alike have hosted millions of hours of proceedings online.62 Hundreds of
thousands of judges, lawyers, and court staff have now paid the “switching
costs” that everyone else, in workplaces and schools the world over, have also
paid: downloading Zoom, buying laptops and webcams, and learning how
to artfully conceal wearing gym shorts to work. The “Zooming” of litigation,
as Chief Judge Lee Rosenthal and coauthors recently put it, has worked a
radical change in the day-to-day operation of the courts—and, critically, a
good amount of it is likely to stick even after the pandemic recedes.63
Some of the procedural questions raised by virtual court proceedings are
strikingly basic. What degree of public access is necessary to satisfy “open
court” requirements? Does a full-time YouTube channel, as many courts
created during the pandemic, satisfy legal requirements,64 or does the digital
divide necessitate other forms of publicly funded digital access, whether
courthouse—or even community based kiosks? Likewise, when courts stream
proceedings, what are the minimum hardware requirements? And what are
best practices in terms of camera angles and lighting, to ensure meaningful
access and faithful translation from the in-person to the online versions?
Chief judges, court administrators, rulemakers, and legislators are already
hard at work crafting these rules, guidelines, and practices.65
Far harder will be traffic rules that determine which cases move online and
which ones remain in person—and, perhaps more importantly, who gets to
62
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See, e.g., Erika Rickard & Qudsiya Naqui, Coronavirus Accelerates State Court Modernization Efforts,
PEW
(June
18,
2020),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/articles/2020/06/18/coronavirus-accelerates-state-court-modernization-efforts
[https://perma.cc/7SUS-7SYZ] (noting that the Michigan courts alone hosted 200,000 hours
of Zoom hearings during a single two-month span of the pandemic).
Scott Dodson, Hon. Lee H. Rosenthal & Christopher L. Dodson, The Zooming of Federal Civil
Litigation, 104 JUDICATURE 13, 13-17, 19 (2020).
U.S. CTS., Federal Courts Participate in Audio Livestream Pilot (Dec. 15, 2020),
https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2020/12/15/federal-courts-participate-audio-livestreampilot?utm_campaign=usc-news&utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery
[https://perma.cc/ZT4J-CRRT]; TEX. OFF. OF CT. ADMIN., How to Create a YouTube Channel,
https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1448819/how-to-youtube-channel-9120.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CWW3-AN4Q].
See, e.g., NAT’L CTR FOR STATE CTS, REMOTE HEARINGS AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE: DURING COVID19 AND BEYOND, https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/40365/RRT-Technology-ATJRemote-Hearings-Guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/HDQ3-TPWP]; NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS.,
GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR POST-PANDEMIC COURT TECHNOLOGY: A PANDEMIC RESOURCE FROM
CCJ/COSCA (2020), https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/42332/Guiding-Principlesfor-Court-Technology.pdf [https://perma.cc/KV35-DT4V].
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decide. Part of what will make these traffic rules difficult is that it is unclear
what, precisely, is gained and lost online. On one hand, remote proceedings
can increase access to justice by lowering the cost of legal representation and
shrinking the ranks of those with justice needs who cannot afford competent
counsel. Lawyers bill for the time it takes to travel to and from courthouses—
and to wait one’s turn once there. Transaction costs are especially high in the
parade of smaller-scale proceedings—status conferences, arguments on
motions trained on a specific piece of discovery or claim, and pretrial
hearings—that make up civil litigation.66 The amount of representation
available in any market-based legal system is endogenous to its cost. If the
cost of legal services declines, more people can afford those services.
Less clear is what gets lost—the cost–benefit ledger’s other side—in the
virtual migration. A commonly voiced concern is that online proceedings will
compromise crucial judgments about witness credibility. But the net effects
are not obvious. After all, there’s both more and less on screen. Facial tics
are enhanced, bodily tics invisible.67 More fundamentally, social science
suggests we should not be overly concerned about the impairment of a judge
or jury’s capacity for deception detection during witness testimony. Our
ability to gauge truthfulness was already perilously close to a coin flip, leaving
little room for further erosion.68 Nor is there an obvious hit to truth telling
itself. Conventionally understood, “open court” provisions and confrontation
rights curtail perjury by lending a sense of conscience to the proceedings and
keeping “triers keenly alive,” as the Supreme Court has put it, “to a sense of
their responsibility and to the importance of their functions.”69 But online,
livestreamed proceedings might be more publicly available, not less,
increasing the shaming power of watchful eyes.

66
67
68

69

The same is true of depositions taken in distant cities or towns.
See, e.g., Molly Treadway Johnson & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Videoconferencing in Criminal Proceedings:
Legal and Empirical Issues and Directions for Research, 28 LAW & POL’Y 211, 215–16 (2006).
See Charles F. Bond Jr. & Bella M. DePaulo, Accuracy of Deception Judgements, 10 PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCH. REV. 214, 214 (2006) (concluding, after an extensive meta-analysis, that “people
achieve an average of 54% correct lie–truth judgments, correctly classifying 47% of lies as deceptive
and 61% of truths as nondeceptive”). See generally Renee Danser, D. James Greiner, Elizabeth Guo
& Erik Koltun, Remote Testimonial Fact-Finding, in LEGAL TECH AND THE FUTURE OF CIVIL JUSTICE
(David Freeman Engstrom ed., forthcoming 2022) (on file with author) (reviewing the large body
of research on detection deception, including the relative importance of verbal and paraverbal cues,
the relative competence of individuals and groups, and the possibility that deception attribution
might be biased against certain groups). For a recent exploration in the popular press, see Jessica
Seigel & Knowable Mag., You’ve Been Lied to About Lying, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 27, 2021),
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2021/03/how-to-spot-a-liar/618425
[https://perma.cc/G7D6-JG4L].
Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984) (internal citations omitted).
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The graver concern is likely to be distributive, and it will come not just at
trial or other proceedings featuring live testimony, but also in the ceaseless
stream of smaller-scale hearings and motions practice that do not. Two types
of concerns predominate: efficacy and empathy. Efficacy concerns are
perhaps easiest to see. The most pointed version comes where only one side
can afford to appear in person, and so one side physically stands before judge
or jury and the other side is piped in. Yet even in a litigation system where
both sides of the “v.” are remote, one might worry about the effects of a
digital divide.70 If litigation’s haves enjoy access to stable Wi-Fi or highproduction-value digital demonstratives and its have-nots don’t, then the
move online could exacerbate the distributive effects—already pronounced
in the analog, in-person context—within the legal system.71
Empathy effects are subtler and not easily disentangled from efficacy. A
small but flawed empirical literature—mostly observational studies from the
first time the system made a substantial move online in the 2000s—finds
worrying evidence that parties participating virtually do systematically
worse than counterparts participating in person across a range of contexts,
from bail hearings to immigration proceedings.72 While the precise
mechanism remains unclear, it seems likely that disparate outcomes occur
because virtual participants are less relatable on a two-dimensional screen
than their flesh-and-blood equivalents.73 Relatability might not matter
70

71

72

73

The digital divide is both “first-order” (that is, access to digital devices or broadband) and “secondorder” (that is, proficiency in using available technologies). See Victor D. Quintanilla, Kurt
Hugenberg, Margaret Hagan & Amy Gonzales, Digital Inequalities and Access to Justice, in LEGAL
TECH AND THE FUTURE OF CIVIL JUSTICE, supra note 68. That said, the digital divide may be
decreasing, including among racial and ethnic minorities. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, EXEC.
OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, MAPPING THE DIGITAL DIVIDE 1, 3 (2015), https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/wh_digital_divide_issue_brief.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/4KA8-A9ZL].
See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 95, 125 fig.3, 149 (1974); Albert Yoon, The Importance of Litigant Wealth, 59 DEPAUL L.
REV. 649, 652 (2010).
See Shari Seidman Diamond, Locke E. Bowman, Manyee Wong & Matthew M. Patton, Efficiency
and Cost: The Impact of Videoconferenced Hearings on Bail Decisions, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
869-70 (2010); Frank M. Walsh & Edward M. Walsh, Effective Processing or Assembly-Line Justice? The
Use of Teleconferencing in Asylum Removal Hearings, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J., 259, 259-71 (2008); Dane
Thorley & Joshua Mitts, Trial by Skype: A Causality-Oriented Replication Exploring the Use of Remote Video
Adjudication in Immigration Removal Proceedings, 59 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 82, 82–83 (2019). That said,
no randomized field studies study the effect of video conferencing, as against face-to-face
communication, on case outcomes. See Danser et al., supra note 68, manuscript at 8.
This, in any event, is the theorized mechanism of studies performed in other contexts, including
telemedicine and job interviews. See, e.g., Greg J. Sears, Haiyan Zhang, Willi H. Wiesner, Rick D.
Hackett & Yufei Yuan, A Comparative Assessment of Videoconference and Face-to-Face Employment Interviews,
51 MGMT. DECISION 1733, 1742 (2013) (noting lower ratings for likability, though not competence,
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where two human parties appear virtually. Empathy (and also efficacy, for
that matter) are relative—positional goods, economists would say. But
moving litigation online could matter very much where one party is a person
and the other a disembodied corporation, systematically skewing outcomes
in favor of the latter.
Plainly more empirical work needs to be done on these and other
questions.74 Above all, our last round of empirical study came at a very
different time, with high-latency, low-resolution systems that look nothing
like today’s Zoom, let alone the immersive telepresence systems that provide
a rich sense of colocation and are fast becoming the norm in corporate
America. As discussed further below, the migration online will present a new
frontier for empirically minded procedural research and new troves of data
to power it.75
For now, however, it is not hard to see the critically important
implications for the system’s adversarial architecture and the procedural
rules that structure it. First, the migration online brings complex trade-offs
from an access-to-justice perspective. An all-online system might increase
litigant access by bringing legal representation, or an ability to appear pro se,
within the realm of possibility for low- or middle-income litigants who have
been priced out of the market for legal services. Digitization can thus dent
the access to justice concerns that have arisen as American social policy has
been steadily judicialized and as litigation’s growing complexity has sunk
PeopleLaw.76 But efficacy or empathy effects could skew case outcomes once
there. Armed with better technology, litigation’s haves might welcome the
online migration as one more way to come out ahead. We might open the
doors of the courthouse wider only to relegate some to its digital basement.
And new and easier online access to small claims can be regressive reforms

74
75
76

in a job interview setting). That said, randomized field studies in both of these non-legal contexts
find that videoconferencing either has no effect or can even benefit remote participants. See Carlos
De Las Cuevas, M. Teresa Arredondo, M. Fernanda Cabrera, Hubert Sulzenbacher & Ulrich
Meise, Randomized Clinical Trial of Telepsychiatry Through Videoconference Versus Face-to-Face Conventional
Psychiatric Treatment, 12 TELEMEDICINE & E-HEALTH, 341, 347 (2006) (finding no effect on medical
decisions); Derek S. Chapman & Patricia M. Rowe, The Impact of Videoconference Technology, Interview
Structure, and Interviewer Gender on Interviewer Evaluations in the Employment Interview: A Field Experiment, 74
J. OCCUPATIONAL & ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCH., 279, 291 (2001) (finding that job interviewees
were rated higher than their in-person counterparts).
For an initial effort to understand some of the lessons from the pandemic-based migration online,
see Elizabeth Thornburg, Observing Online Courts: Lessons from the Pandemic, 54 FAM. L.Q. 181 (2021).
See infra Part III.
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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that do far more to benefit the middle class.77 Importantly, these various
tradeoffs may play out differently across different substantive litigation
contexts. The net effect of the online migration may prove different in
eviction cases than in consumer debt or prisoner cases, and different still in
antitrust or other “complex” litigation areas.
If these trade-offs are complex and variable, then the question of who
decides makes management of those trade-offs even more so. In particular,
what mix of judicial discretion, party consent, and no-flex rules makes sense
as a way to capture the efficiencies and access-to-justice benefits of moving
online while blunting distributive impacts? The first approach, and the one
embodied in existing federal rules, is to leave the move online to judicial
discretion. Rule 43 gives judges full discretion to “permit” remote testimony
“[f]or good cause in compelling circumstances and with appropriate
safeguards.”78 A second possible approach comes by analogy to forum
selection—one of the few places in American procedure where judicial
discretion has been curtailed and something closer to ironclad party control
prevails. On this model, judicial discretion would yield to party consent by
making party agreements to move online presumptively valid.79 A third
approach is formalist per se rules, whether issued from rulemakers or
legislators, automatically moving certain types of cases—evictions, consumer
debt cases, prisoner cases—to a remote forum or making it a strong default.
One could even opt for a system that mixes and matches these approaches.
Rule 30(b)(4), as an example, sprinkles authority among parties and judge in
stating that “parties may stipulate—or the court may on motion order—that

77

78
79

Omri Ben-Shahar, The Paradox of Access Justice, and Its Application to Mandatory Arbitration, 83 UNIV.
CHI. L. REV. 1755, 1755 (2016) (“Paradoxically, access justice often benefits various elites while
paid for directly by taxpayers and indirectly by weaker groups.” The result is a “regressive crosssubsidy” “because groups that are not the intended targets of the intervention deploy access and its
benefits disproportionately.”); Anthony Niblett & Albert H. Yoon, Unintended Consequences: The
Regressive Effects of Increased Access to Courts, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 5, 27–28 (2017)
(concluding, based on empirical evidence, that raising jurisdictional limits in a small claims court
disproportionately increased better-heeled plaintiffs).
FED. R. CIV. P. 43.
Note that the adoption of this approach could emerge even under the current rules. The typical
way to determine whether procedural defaults can be altered is by asking whether a procedure is
sufficiently central to the mission of the courts and then denoting some procedures as falling within
a “core,” where party-stipulated deviations are not permitted, and others as falling outside the
“core,” where party-stipulated deviations are presumptively enforced save evidence of grossly unfair
bargaining leverage or other pathology. See generally Ronen Avraham & William H.J. Hubbard, The
Spectrum of Procedural Flexibility, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 883 (2020). If online proceedings were found to
fall outside the core, then perhaps party consent would trump even Rule 43’s seeming vesting of
discretion in trial judges.
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a deposition be taken by telephone or other remote means.”80 As William
Hubbard and Ronen Avraham point out, party consent and judicial
discretion exist along an often murky continuum.81
Each of these approaches has its virtues and vices, and it is not hard to
see some of the more salient tradeoffs. If remote proceedings are left up to
party consent, we might worry that consent could become a litigation
tactic—a bargaining chip that litigation’s haves could use to delay
adjudication or perhaps even extract concessions on discovery or other
procedural rights from have-nots.82 More concretely, a pro se litigant or a
party with pro bono or “low-bono” counsel might bargain away valuable
discovery or other procedural or substantive rights in order to secure a lower
cost, virtual forum, or that repeat players, unmoved by available concessions,
might instead compel in-person proceedings to maximize the costs incurred
by the one shotters on the other side. Judicial discretion to parse these
situations could mitigate these concerns, but it could just as easily exacerbate
them.
Here we can begin to glimpse the full extent of the procedural challenges
as large chunks of the system move (or stay) online. The trade-offs between
efficiency, access, and equity are hard, and the empirical knowledge that can
guide the choice of rule architecture, or the exercise of judicial discretion
within a given architecture, is thin to nonexistent. The future of litigation will
turn on how well our rules of procedure, and our ways of procedure-making,
rise to meet these twin challenges.
That process is likely to look different at the federal and state levels, but
there is reason for concern in both contexts. At the state level, a wider set of
options is available, including substance-specific rules and procedural
tracking, because of a weaker, more defeasible commitment to a “one size

80

81
82

FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(4). See also FED. R. CIV. P. 29 (noting that the parties may stipulate, in
addition to the taking of depositions, that “other procedures governing or limiting discovery be
modified”).
Hubbard & Avraham, supra note 79.
This may be one reason why some courts have made clear that trial judges have discretion to
compel a virtual move. See, e.g., Tex. Sup. Ct., Thirty-Sixth Emergency Order Regarding the
COVID-19 State of Disaster, Misc. Docket No. 21-9026 (2021), https://www.txcourts.gov/media/
1451833/219026.pdf [https://perma.cc/L6RQ-GXRL] (“Subject only to constitutional
limitations, all courts in Texas may in any case, civil or criminal—and must to avoid risk to court
staff, parties, attorneys, jurors, and the public—without a participant’s consent . . . allow or require
anyone involved in any hearing, deposition, or other proceeding of any kind—including but not
limited to a party, attorney, witness, court reporter, grand juror, or petit juror—to participate
remotely, such as by teleconferencing, videoconferencing, or other means. . . . .”).

2202

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 23:6

fits all” approach.83 This is important, for some of the most obvious
implementations—separate rules for specific types of cases or proceedings
where distributive concerns are thought especially acute—will require a
relaxation of transsubstantivity. But there are risks in such an approach. Any
proposed rule that is specific to, say, consumer debt cases will draw the
attention, and perhaps the ire, of a billion-dollar credit card industry. There
is a reason why, in the social welfare context, universalist programs like social
security are more politically robust and generous than residualist ones like
TANF or SNAP (food stamps).84 The question will be whether a rulemaking
process can produce rules that take account of the full set of procedural values
at stake, or whether it will instead yield a system that allows litigation’s haves
to gain judgments, wage garnishments, and eviction orders with ever more
ruthless efficiency.85
At the federal level, available options will, for better or worse, be more
limited. For starters, there are fewer discrete classes of high-volume cases that
might lend themselves to substance-specific rules.86 More fundamentally,
categorical, substance-specific, and no-flex rules will be a harder sell at the
federal level because of the system’s transprocedural commitments and its
allergy to procedural tracking.87 If recent decades are any guide, federal level
procedure is instead likely to double down on judicial control, trusting in
judges to manage complex trade-offs on a case-by-case basis and deepening
the pools of discretion that have defined the past century of American
procedure. This approach may come out well. It may not. The paucity of
empirical knowledge to guide judges is worrying, particularly because the
near-term decisions judges make will set a trajectory for online proceedings
that may prove hard to undo, even if it becomes clear that more
thoroughgoing changes to the system’s procedural architecture, or a set of
substance-specific rules, are best.

83
84
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86
87

Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure: An Essay on Adjusting the “One Size Fits
All” Assumption, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 377, 394 nn.74–75 (2010).
PAUL PIERSON, DISMANTLING THE WELFARE STATE? REAGAN, THATCHER, AND THE POLITICS
OF RETRENCHMENT 100–03 (1994).
Procedural debates tend to privilege results over process values. See Jane Donoghue, The Rise of
Digital Justice: Courtroom Technology, Public Participation and Access to Justice, 80 MOD. L. REV. 995, 1003
(2017) (“[L]egal processes are frequently evaluated on the basis of whether they are effective in
achieving ‘good results’, rather than their capacity to serve process values.”).
The two types that come to mind are prisoner and social security cases.
See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and Democracy: Restoring a Realistic Prospect
of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 399, 410 (2011) (discussing failed proposals to impose nonnegotiable limits on interrogatories and depositions in the discovery context).
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B. Information Rules: From TAR Wars to Legal Tech’s Great Beyond
A second way to glimpse the rule reckonings that lie ahead in a digitized
system is to focus on legal tech in some of its most advanced forms: the suite of
lawyer driven tech tools that made their first and most significant inroads in ediscovery but are quickly moving to higher-order legal cognitions, from legal
analytics to outcome prediction. If the migration online will require new traffic
rules, the new digital lawyer’s toolkit will require adaptation of existing
information rules that shape who gets what information, when, and in what form.
As I have written elsewhere, the e-discovery variants of legal tech—often
referred to as “technology-assisted review” (TAR) or “predictive coding”—
are already spilling into deep pools of judicial discretion and pressing on the
American legal system’s adversarial architecture.88 For starters, TAR holds
the potential to reshape the system by fundamentally shifting the distribution
of litigation costs among litigants. TAR requires human lawyers to “label” a
subset of a corpus of documents for relevance or privilege that can be used
to train a machine learning system to flag the rest. Implemented well—and
that is a key caveat—TAR performs better than purely human, eyes-on
review, and at a fraction of the cost.89
TAR’s potential efficiency gains are profoundly important, for
rulemaking in recent decades has been pre-occupied—some would say
obsessed—with litigation costs. Rulemakers have tried to mitigate cost
concerns with proportionality rules that require a judge to decide whether a
discovery request is proportional to case needs. But proportionality
judgments are tricky because TAR can yield gains in both efficiency and
accuracy. For a requesting party, more efficient review justifies more
expansive searches, including a wider net of custodians and fewer keyword
searches to cull documents prior to automated review. For a producing party,
88
89

See David Freeman Engstrom & Jonah B. Gelbach, Legal Tech, Civil Procedure, and the Future of
Adversarialism, 169 U. PA. L. REV. 1001, 1071–86 (2021).
For the two most frequently cited studies, see Maura R. Grossman & Gordon V. Cormack,
Technology-Assisted Review in E-Discovery Can Be More Effective and More Efficient Than Exhaustive Manual
Review, 17 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2011), and Herbert L. Roitblat, Anne Kershaw & Patrick Oot,
Document Categorization in Legal Electronic Discovery: Computer Classification vs. Manual Review, 61 J. AM.
SOC’Y FOR INFO. SCI. & TECH. 70 (2010). These two studies were the principal authority in Da
Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe, 287 F.R.D. 182, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), a leading case vouching for
TAR’s efficiencies. Others, however, are more skeptical about TAR’s current capabilities. See
Robert Keeling, Rishi Chhatwal, Peter Gronvall & Nathaniel Huber-Fliflet, Humans Against the
Machines: Reaffirming the Superiority of Human Attorneys in Legal Document Review and Examining the
Limitations of Algorithmic Approaches to Discovery, 26 RICH. J. L. & TECH. 1, 9–11 (2020) (deconstructing
the TREC evaluation process and showing the limited nature of its findings regarding TAR’s
advantages over human review).
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however, accuracy gains mean a more generous bounty of documents.90 Put
these dynamics together and TAR has the potential to shift the “unit cost” of
discovery—that is, the average cost of each produced document—up, down,
or not at all. And it is judges, drawing from an implicit “set point” in terms
of tolerable cost, who will decide which it is. If trial judges exercise their
considerable discretion in ways that harness TAR’s efficiencies and reduce
discovery costs, rather than merely greenlighting more expansive discovery,
the effect on civil litigation, from the availability of counsel to settlement
patterns, could be profound.91 Even Twombly’s plausibility pleading standard,
founded on concern about litigation cost asymmetries and plaintiffs’ ability
to externalize those costs onto defendants, might see its theoretical
foundation erode.92
If those were the only changes TAR put on the table, its propagation
throughout the civil justice system might generate only limited controversy.
But TAR is also spurring motions practice with deeper implications for the
system’s adversarial architecture via disputes over a party’s request for the
other side’s “seed set” or other technical details about its search and review
methodology in order to gauge the comprehensiveness of a production. And
these “seed set” disputes—an emerging “TAR wars”—are increasingly being
argued via the work product rule.
That rule, of course, now resides in Rule 26 and state-level equivalents but
was born in 1947 in Hickman v. Taylor.93 In an iconic concurrence, Justice
Jackson wrote: “A common law trial is and always should be an adversary
proceeding. Discovery was hardly intended to enable a learned profession to
perform its functions either without wits or on wits borrowed from the
adversary.”94

90

91

92
93
94

See Seth Katsuya Endo, Discovery Hydraulics, 52 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 1317, 1354–55 (2019)
(providing a framework for considering proportionality issues in discovery); see also Ralph C. Losey,
Predictive Coding and the Proportionality Doctrine: A Marriage Made in Big Data, 26 REGENT U. L. REV. 7,
15–16 (2013) (arguing that predictive coding is the answer to the proportionality doctrine); Judge
Andrew Jay Peck, Foreword, 26 REGENT U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2014) (suggesting that technology will
resolve the discovery problems it created).
See Linda Sandstrom Simard, Seeking Proportional Discovery: The Beginning of the End of Procedural
Uniformity in Civil Rules, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1919, 1948 (2018) (“Freeing states from the binds of
uniformity may, over time, encourage even broader procedural innovations.”).
See Engstrom & Gelbach, supra note 88, at 1059.
329 U.S. 495, 511–12 (1947) (establishing the work product doctrine).
Id. at 516.
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Part of what the work product rule does is create a zone of privacy where
a lawyer can prepare her case without interference.95 But a deeper purpose
is to create the conditions necessary for a well-functioning adversarial
system.96 Good lawyering, the thinking goes, will beget good lawyering if
parties are willing to pay for it. But parties will pay for it only if we prevent
one side from free-riding on the work of the other—in Justice Jackson’s
terms, if we prevent parties from borrowing the other side’s wits. But note as
well the deep distributive concern this brackets: some litigants can afford
better lawyers than others. Such is the Hickman bargain: we tolerate
inequalities in the name of good lawyering.
Is a seed set work product? Some courts say no, some yes. Courts in the
“yes” camp say the seed set reveals attorney mental impressions the same
way as a list of “hot docs” used to prepare a deposition witness, as in the
Third Circuit’s Sporck case.97 That means near-absolute protection as
“opinion” work product. But strong or even absolute protection is worrying
if you care about a level litigation playing field. TAR systems, like any
machine learning system, are “socio-technical assemblages,” not turnkey
engines.98 An important implication is that TAR is manipulable by humans
in the tool’s construction and tuning, and this manipulation can run the
gamut from outright abuse (e.g., fudging document labels or rigging the
selection or finetuning of models), to a more benign but still respondent
friendly calibration of the system to favor precision (the proportion of
unresponsive documents allowed into a production) over recall (the
proportion of responsive documents identified).99 If litigation’s haves need
95

96
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98
99

Id. at 512 (“[T]he general policy against invading the privacy of an attorney’s course of preparation
is so well recognized and so essential to an orderly working of our system of legal procedure . . .
.”); see also Ronald J. Allen, Mark F. Grady, Daniel D. Polsby & Michael S. Yashko, A Positive Theory
of the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 359, 362 (1990)
(describing how the work product doctrine “provides the level of confidentiality needed to induce
the attorney to perform the optimal amount of legal investigation”); Jeff A. Anderson, Gena E.
Cadieux, George E. Hays, Michael B. Hingerty & Richard J. Kaplan, The Work Product Doctrine, 68
CORNELL L. REV. 760, 785 (1983) (describing how Hickman “preserv[ed] a zone of privacy within
which attorneys could work”).
Engstrom & Gelbach, supra note 88, at 1078 (“The work product doctrine creates the conditions
necessary for a well-functioning adversarial system by safeguarding returns on, and thus investment
in, legal talent.”).
Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 318 (3d Cir. 1985).
Mike Ananny & Kate Crawford, Seeing Without Knowing: Limitations of the Transparency Ideal and Its
Application to Algorithmic Accountability, 20 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 973, 985 (2016).
Compare Maura R. Grossman & Gordon V. Cormack, Continuous Active Learning for TAR,
PRACTICAL L.J., April–May 2016, at 32, 37 (2016) (describing how machine-learning algorithms
can minimize discovery disputes between parties), with Neel Guha, Peter Henderson & Diego A.
Zambrano, How to Sabotage Legal Tech (May 7, 2021) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
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not show their work to the other side, then they can shade discovery to their
advantage and use their better technology and technologists (if the other side
can afford technologists at all) to make sure it sticks.100
TAR is already attracting a rich law review literature exploring these
issues, including bracing proposals that would have courts adopt top-down,
rule-like protocols for collaborative use of TAR or even task the requesting
party, not the responding one, with formulating and conducting searches and
reviews.101 Each of these would shift, or even reset, the system’s traditional
commitment of discovery means and methods to parties with only sporadic
judicial involvement to referee disputes.102 The pay-offs could be significant.
As with other areas of algorithmic accountability, we could, despite pervasive
concern about AI’s “black box” opacity, end up with a discovery system that
is more transparent than at present about its costs and less prone to abuse.103
But compelled cooperation in discovery could just as easily erode litigant
autonomy and the system’s foundational commitment to adversarialism in
favor of something more judicially supervised and technologist
empowering.104 A collaborative approach could redirect the professional

100

101

102

103

104

author) (cataloging the ways that TAR is gameable, particularly by litigants with greater technical
capacity and sophistication).
See Seth Katsuya Endo, Technological Opacity & Procedural Injustice, 59 B.C. L. REV. 821, 863 (2018)
(detailing how the “black-box” quality of predictive coding makes it harder for less sophisticated
litigants to challenge the predictive coding process).
See Bruce H. Kobayashi, Law’s Information Revolution as Procedural Reform: Predictive Search as a Solution
to the In Terrorem Effect of Externalized Discovery Costs, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1473, 1477 (2014) (“[T]he
idea that allocating costs to the requesting party can be used to usefully limit the scope and cost of
discovery by improving litigant incentives is gaining acceptance.”). For an example of a courtimposed protocol that has drawn criticism by providing for party–opponent validation, see In re
Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litigation, No. 1:16-cv-08637, 2018 WL 1146371, at *2–4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 3,
2018) (setting forth a detailed protocol for search methodology and validation using TAR). See also
Christine Payne & Michelle Six, A Proposed Technology-Assisted Framework, LAW360 (Apr. 27, 2020,
5:22 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1267032/a-proposed-technology-assisted-reviewframework [https://perma.cc/ZY36-WCQN] (arguing that TAR has become “weaponized” via
court-imposed protocols that impose a higher standard and greater obligations on producing parties
than the analog discovery system does).
For a defense of the current “self-executing” system of discovery in which parties choose their own
means absent clear evidence of abuse, see Paul Weiner & Denise Backhouse, “Transparency,”
“Discovery-on-Discovery” Type Disclosures, and Party-Opponent Validation in eDiscovery, 70 LABOR L.J. 212,
213 (2019) (describing how the Federal Rules do not require parties to be transparent in discovery).
For an example of the argument in the antidiscrimination context, see Jon Kleinberg, Jens Ludwig,
Sendhil Mullainathan & Cass R. Sunstein, Discrimination in the Age of Algorithms, 10 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 113, 114 (2018) (describing how regulated algorithm designs will make proving
discrimination claims easier not harder).
See Dana A. Remus, The Uncertain Promise of Predictive Coding, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1691, 1711 (2014)
(discussing how judges and lawyers are “ceding control” of litigation procedure to experts who
prioritize “technological use and development above all else”).
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standards and ethical obligations of lawyers away from clients and toward a
more diffuse fealty to the court and public. In Hickman terms, the market for
good lawyering could erode, however subtly.
The potential for a convulsive shift in American procedure is already
great, but TAR may also just be the canary in the coalmine. Reports reveal
that Walmart and other large companies facing recurring types of
litigation—including slip-and-falls and employment disputes—are actively
working with large law firms and technology companies to develop a new
and potent legal tech tools.105 These tools remain proprietary, but they
appear to do two things and confer two types of litigation advantages. First,
they perform outcome predictions, including the likely result of a case and
the likely expense incurred in litigating it given key case characteristics,
including the identity of plaintiffs’ counsel. The tools thus bring a heightened
ability to do what repeat players and litigation’s haves do to win out over one
shotters and litigation’s have-nots: settle out the cases with strong claims,
litigate the winners, and play the long game by playing for rules at the
appellate level.106 Second, the new tools can reportedly generate pleadings
and papers—an answer, or an initial set of discovery requests—thus reducing
litigation costs.
Much has been made of tools of this sort, and some commentators paint
a rosy portrait. Continued proliferation of such tools might level the litigation
playing field by allowing smaller law firms to do battle with larger, corporatefacing, BigLaw ones.107 PeopleLaw, as just noted, might rebound. But it is
just as easy to paint a darker portrait. Indeed, over the near to medium term,
a convergence of factors may ensure that only litigation’s haves will be able
to develop potent legal tech applications and gain their advantages. After all,
large entities like Walmart may uniquely have the resources and capital
access necessary to build technical capacity.108 More importantly, it is large
repeat players who enjoy privileged access to data, particularly the holy grail
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See Engstrom & Gelbach, supra note 88, at 1039–40 n.142.
See Galanter, supra note 71, at 125 (describing how favorable rules, favorable priorities, and a party’s
ability to structure transactions and “play for rules” as “repeat players” collectively contribute to
“haves” coming out ahead in litigation).
See, e.g., Albert H. Yoon, The Post-Modern Lawyer: Technology and the Democratization of Legal
Representation, 66 U. TORONTO L.J. 456, 457 (2016) (“[T]hese technologies increase accessibility to
legal services in a way that can benefit lawyer and litigants alike.”).
Engstrom & Gelbach, supra note 88, at 1021–30 (cataloging the technical limits of NLP and its
requirements of significant technical capacity and significant manual lawyer inputs).
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of case outcome data that is otherwise unavailable within a system where secret
settlements predominate.109
If legal tech continues its advance and the haves have it and the havenots don’t, then it is not hard to see that litigation will increasingly feature
requests for production of the other side’s digital outputs. That might be a
plaintiff seeking access to Walmart’s outcome prediction. It might be
litigants, or even a judge, demanding a party’s case-outcome predictions to
see through its motion to transfer venue on purely “convenience” grounds.
And it might involve a request for the outputs of a contract-analysis tool as a
kind of parol evidence about the drafter’s intent. Whatever the context,
judges will increasingly be asked whether machine outputs enjoy
protection—that is, whether borrowed bits should be treated the same as
borrowed wits, even where one side’s sharper wits reflect nothing more than
its ability to pay for the best software or its privileged access to data.
The rule reckonings for legal tech tools, particularly beyond TAR, are
hard to glimpse and necessarily speculative because they will depend on the
arc of technological development. But consider two broad observations that
may help structure future thinking.
First, the application of analog work product rules to new digital litigation
tools is not obvious. As just one example, advanced legal tech tools that
perform outcome predictions tend to be created far upstream, by teams of
lawyers and technologists long before any particular case arises; use of the
tool in a particular case, by contrast, may entail little more than a keystroke.
Machine outputs may thus qualify only for qualified protection under Rule
26(b)(3) as “fact” work product, not the near-absolute protection afforded
“opinion” work product.110 Upstream development also implicates Rule
26(b)’s “in anticipation of litigation” requirement: many outcome-prediction
tools will have been created and finetuned neither during nor in anticipation
of any particular litigation; rather, they are created for all litigations.111 Past
case law, of course, says that case predictions, at least as to a specific case
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The result is that most civil-side cases exit dockets with an uninformative voluntary dismissal under
Rule 41 or state equivalents.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A)–(B) (prescribing qualified protection for some materials, commonly
referred to as “fact” work product, absent a showing of need and hardship, but near-absolute
protection for materials, commonly referred to as “opinion” work product, that reflect attorney
“mental impressions”).
Id. (protecting from disclosure “documents and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation
of litigation or for trial”).
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rather than a cluster of cases, enjoy protection.112 But those decisions came
in an analog world, with human lawyers, not machine learning models,
poring over case files to arrive at liability estimates.
Second, thinking through these options raises significant questions about
whether procedure is the right vehicle to manage new digital information
flows in the first place. As with the traffic rules that will usher American
litigation online, the efficiency and distributive trade-offs are complex, and
reliable empiricism on the effects of one or another approach surprisingly
thin. Worse, compelled sharing of digital outputs in the name of blunting
legal tech’s distributive impacts will make those tools less valuable, reducing
party incentives to use them or the legal tech industry to produce them. After
all, the value of tools that provide information derives from their
exclusivity—that is, one side has them but the other does not.113 A procedural
regime that aims to level the playing field might end up chilling legal tech’s
production and use in ways that make all worse off.
But if not trial judges operating within wide pools of discretion in our
equity-based system of procedure, then who? The current state of
rulemaking, and of our politics, makes it hard to imagine rulemakers or
legislators becoming involved, at least over the near to medium term. To that
extent, it seems likely that judges will be the front-line regulators of legal
tech’s uptake at a critical moment in its life. Still, the best long-term solutions
may well lie elsewhere, in the legislative creation and funding of “public
option” legal tech or, in the TAR context, the construction of courthouse ediscovery arms to facilitate active judicial management of the discovery
process.114 These possibilities may seem far-fetched and futuristic—only a
notch down from pervasive predictions of robojudges and robolawyers. But
if digitally driven outcome disparities become too great and expose the dirty
underbelly of the Hickman bargain, momentum could steadily build, and it is
not impossible to imagine either or both approaches winning out. The result
would be a seismic change in American justice—a tech-based rethinking of
some of our adversarial system’s procedural cornerstones.
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A good example is Simon v. G.D. Searle & Co., 816 F.2d 397, 403 (8th Cir. 1987), which held that a
defendant’s calculation of its aggregate damages exposure across cases was not protected work
product, but individual case calculations were.
See Engstrom & Gelbach, supra note 88, at 1089 (“[L]egal tools derive much of their value from
their exclusivity—i.e. the fact that one litigant has them and the other does not . . . .”).
It could also mean a legislative refashioning of liability standards to account for a newly unlevel
playing field.
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C. Traffic + Information Rules: From ODR 1.0 to ODR 2.0
A third set of rule reckonings comes with the online dispute resolution
(ODR) platforms—asynchronous online fora where parties can attempt to
bargain their way to settlement—that increasingly dot the civil justice
landscape, both in the United States and elsewhere.115 ODR’s current
technological frontier combines the two technologies already discussed,
coupling an online forum with a range of algorithmic techniques, from
bidding systems to outcome-prediction engines, that provide key information
to disputants as they negotiate their way to settlement. New ODR platforms
thus sit out at more of a medium-term horizon than the simple online
migration of court proceedings or lawyer-driven legal tech tools. In time,
however, ODR may prove the most significant of current legal tech
applications because it is likely to be the first place that courts themselves, rather
than lawyers and litigants, deploy legal tech tools that perform higher-order
legal cognitions.116 Indeed, ODR will be the bridge, if there is to be one, to
fully automated adjudication. Most important of all—and this is a key
point—the new ODR platforms will, perhaps unique among the current
menu of legal tech innovations, require a mix of traffic and information rules
to run well.
ODR is not new. The private sector has used it for years. Companies
such as eBay, Amazon, and Modria adjudicate tens of millions of mostly
commercial disputes per year, easily dwarfing the case flows in all American
courts combined.117 In fact, the advent of private ODR was a prerequisite
for the emergence of the current e-commerce empire—a way to manage
conflict and create trust amidst rapid innovation in online markets that would

115
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For overviews of ODR technology, see SUSSKIND, supra note 60, and ETHAN KATSH & ORNA
RABINOVICH-EINY, DIGITAL JUSTICE: TECHNOLOGY AND THE INTERNET OF DISPUTES (2017).
The “advanced” here is important. Many state courts are already providing online form completion
services. See, e.g., J.J. Prescott, Improving Access to Justice in State Courts with Platform Technology, 70 VAND.
L. REV. 1993, 1999 (2017); Amy J. Schmitz, Expanding Access to Remedies through E-Court Initiatives, 67
BUFF. L. REV. 89, 92–93 (2019) (discussing how courts in Michigan, Ohio, and New York are
innovating and developing online dispute resolution pilot projects to resolve certain types of
disputes).
See KATSH & RABINOVICH-EINY, supra note 115, at 10–11 (describing how eBay’s SquareTrade
software provided “some structure to the communication and to the flow of information between
the parties,” allowing it to facilitate and “handle millions of disputes” over time); Rory Van Loo,
Federal Rules of Platform Procedure, 88 U. CHI. L. REV. 829, 837–50 (2021) (discussing the different
dispute resolution strategies employed by online marketplace, social, sharing, and search platforms).
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have quickly overwhelmed the relatively inelastic capacities of public
courts.118
Court adoption of ODR, by contrast, is of more recent vintage. Indeed,
the first major wave of court adoptions—that is, formally court-linked ODR
platforms119—came as recently as 2016.120 Since then, however, ODR has
steadily gained momentum, fueled by the emergence of multiple software
vendors vying for market share and a growing portfolio of pilots in
Michigan,121 Ohio,122 and Utah,123 among other states, and globally, from
Canada124 to the U.K.125 to Singapore.126 More recently, a pandemicinduced torrent of civil filings has also spurred innovation, causing many
state courts to implement prehearing “diversion programs” to resolve rising
eviction, consumer debt, and other low-value but systemically important
cases.127 By late 2019, just before the COVID-19 pandemic began, some
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KATSH & RABINOVICH-EINY, supra note 115, at 14 (“No one—neither the courts, nor alternative
processes—is prepared to handle the volume, variety, and character of disputes that are a byproduct of the levels of creative and commercial activity happening online today.”).
This distinguishes ODR platforms that operate outside the court system (e.g., GetAid, SplitUp,
AssetDivider) from platforms that are linked to the court system (e.g., Matterhorn).
For discussion on court adoption of ODR before 2016 and first major court adoptions, see Michael
J. Wolf, Collaborative Technology Improves Access to Justice, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 759, 773–
75 (2012). Earlier efforts, such as a court annexed ODR project in Michigan called “Cyber Court,”
quickly folded. See Brian A. Pappas, Online Court: Online Dispute Resolution and the Future of Small Claims,
12 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 10–11 (2008) (noting reasons for the Michigan Cyber Court’s
abandonment, including lack of funding and litigant privacy concerns); see also Lucille M. Ponte,
The Michigan Cyber Court: A Bold Experiment in the Development of the First Public Virtual Courthouse, 4 N.C.
J.L. & TECH. 51, 58–61 (2002) (discussing Michigan’s “Cyber Court” in detail, including the
composition of judges and the court’s subject matter jurisdiction).
See Off. of Disp. Resol., Resolve a Dispute Online with MI-Resolve, MICH. CTS., https://
courts.michigan.gov/administration/scao/officesprograms/odr/pages/mi-resolve.aspx
[https://perma.cc/SZ2Y-4ERG].
See generally J.J. Prescott & Alexander Sanchez, Platform Procedure: Using Technology to Facilitate (Efficient)
Civil Settlement, in SELECTION AND DECISION IN JUDICIAL PROCESS AROUND THE WORLD:
EMPIRICAL INQUIRIES (Yun-chien Chang ed., 2020).
PAULA HANNAFORD-AGOR, KATHRYN J. GENTHON, SUSANNE MITCHELL & DIVYA MATHEW,
IMPACT OF THE UTAH ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ODR) PILOT PROGRAM: FINAL REPORT
(2020), https://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/adr/id/66 [https://perma.cc/NF5RB7FE].
KATSH & RABINOVICH-EINY, supra note 115, at 151 (describing a system in British Columbia that
hosts consumer disputes).
See SUSSKIND, supra note 60 at 166–68 (discussing the use of ODR platforms in England and Wales).
Id. at 172–73.
See JOINT TECH. COMM., CONF. OF STATE CT. ADM’RS, NAT’L ASS’N FOR CT. MGMT., NAT’L
CTR. FOR STATE CTS., JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVES ON ODR AND OTHER VIRTUAL COURT
PROCESSES 1,5 (2020) (suggesting that the number of these types of disputes will likely rise during
the pandemic while U.S. courts have adopted ODR to handle their caseloads in the same period).
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sixty-six state and local courts had already piloted one or another ODR
system.128 By the time the pandemic ends, ODR may well be the new normal.
Currently, most of these court linked ODR platforms are just virtual
gathering places where disputants can engage, typically asynchronously, and
bargain their way to settlement without costly trips to court. They are
“pajama justice,” as some call them.129 And, while ODR platforms are not
merely remote proceedings of the sort described in Section II.A,130 most
current court-linked ODR systems remain relatively straightforward
technologically, providing an asynchronous, 24/7 forum and, in some
instances, access to human facilitators who help disputants organize and
classify their problems and help inform them about their prospects and
options.131
But there is a new type of ODR technology—call it ODR 2.0—that
provides disputants more than just a convenient gathering place or easy
access to human facilitators. ODR 2.0 incorporates algorithmic tools in order
to prime the parties with needed information without the need for a fleshand-blood, human dispute handler.132 The most basic versions, long
128
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For an overview of adoption in the U.S. as of 2019, see C TR. FOR INNOVATION, A.B.A,
O NLINE D ISPUTE R ESOLUTION IN THE U NITED S TATES (2020), https://
www.americanbar.org/groups/centers_commissions/center-for-innovation/online-disputeresolution-in-us [https://perma.cc/H3WG-TS23].
Claire Osborn & Taylor Goldenstein, Area Judges Make Plans to Try Out “Pajama” Court, STATESMAN
NEWS NETWORK, https://www.statesman.com/news/20180618/area-judges-make-plans-to-tryout-pajama-court [https://perma.cc/K5LR-PJ5Z] (Sept. 25, 2018, 9:06 AM); Ali Linan,
Williamson County Commissioners Approve Pilot Program to Speed Up Small Claims Lawsuits, CMTY IMPACT
NEWSPAPER (June 5, 2018, 7:51 PM), https://communityimpact.com/georgetown/citycounty/2018/06/05/williamson-county-commissioners-approve-pilot-program-to-speed-upsmall-claims-lawsuits [https://perma.cc/9B3J-YA86].
See Anjanette H. Raymond & Scott J. Shackelford, Technology, Ethics, and Access to Justice: Should an
Algorithm be Deciding Your Case?, 35 MICH. J. INT’L L. 485, 500 (2014) (“We argue that a true ODR
system is one that allows the parties to do more than merely complain—the platform must involve
the resolution of a dispute and use a neutral facilitator (mediation) or a neutral decision maker
(arbitration).”).
See SUSSKIND, supra note 60, at 153 (noting “tools and methods to help lay people organize and
classify their cases (turning a grievance into a justiciable problem) and to analyse and reason
(coming to a legal view)”).
See SUSSKIND, supra note 60, at 6 (suggesting technology alone can provide tools to court users,
such as helping them understand relevant law); KATSH & RABINOVICH-EINY, supra note 115, at
47 (noting ODR’s shift from “a process that simply facilitates communication of information to
one that processes it”); see also John Zeleznikow, Can Artificial Intelligence and Online Dispute Resolution
Enhance Efficiency and Effectiveness in Courts, 8 INT’L J. FOR CT. ADMIN. 30, 35–36 (2017) (discussing
the integration of artificial intelligence into ODR systems, which enhances the user’s experience
with the platform); Darin Thompson, Creating New Pathways to Justice Using Simple Artificial Intelligence
and Online Dispute Resolution, 2 INT’L J. ONLINE DISP. RES. 4, 12–13 (2015) (positing that
“widespread adoption of [artificial intelligence] in the legal realm” can enhance ODR platforms).
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deployed in private ODR systems, include double-blind bidding to find
overlap in the parties’ reservation prices.133 Slightly more complex versions
draw on the parties’ confidentially inputted preferences or even similar past
disputes within the system in order to present the disputants with settlement
“packages” on issues in controversy.134 A still more sophisticated version
incorporates an outcome prediction engine that uses predictive analytics to
arm the parties with a BATNA—the best alternative to a negotiated
agreement—or a set of probabilities over multiple potential outcomes so they
can bargain in the shadow of what a court is likely to decide.135 One way of
thinking about this is that an AI-based ODR system replaces a human
mediator who, in the analog mediation context, would engage in a kind of
shuttle diplomacy, moving back and forth between the parties and “fogging
their glasses,” as one mediator put it, to nudge them toward settlement.136
Whatever the algorithmic method or the best analogy for describing it,
ODR’s clear future is to provide an automated, non-human, informational
bridge from legal claim to remedy.137
From a procedural perspective, ODR brings all the complexities of when
and how to migrate formal legal proceedings online—the traffic rules noted
previously. Indeed, ODR platforms raise the same complex trade-offs among
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This approach, launched by ODR pioneer Cybersettle in 1998 and now a pervasive one, has
claimant and defendant submit their highest and lowest settlement numbers in search of overlap.
See Diane J. Levin, Cybersettle Makes the Case for Resolving Disputes Online, MEDIATION CHANNEL (Feb.
20, 2008), https://mediationchannel.com/2008/02/20/cybersettle-makes-the-casefor-resolvingdisputes-online [https://perma.cc/9GVV-UH2K] (explaining that Cybersettle provides disputants
three opportunities to submit settlement offers or demands and settles disputes when an offer is
equal to or exceeds the opposing disputant’s demand).
Ernest Thiessen, Paul Miniato & Bruce Hiebert, ODR and eNegotiation, in ONLINE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE, A TREATISE ON TECHNOLOGY AND DISPUTE
RESOLUTION 345 (Mohamed S. Abdel Wahab, Ethan Katsh & Daniel Rainey eds., 2012); KATSH
& RABINOVICH-EINY, supra note 115, at 35–36, 49 (describing multiple systems and noting, with
reference to Smartsettle, that the “software examines the way in which the parties ranked their
interests and analyzes whether at least one of the parties’ interests can be better met without making
the other party worse off. If there is an alternative solution, the parties are presented with it; they
can then either choose the proposed agreement offered by the software or remain with the
resolution they originally negotiated.”).
See Zeleznikow, supra note 132, at 39–40.
See SUSSKIND, supra note 60, at 6, 298 (referring to ODR as “extended courts” and suggesting that
it can help disputants “understand relevant law and the options available to them” and thus “giv[e]
the self-represented some of the heft of a client with a lawyer”). For the “fogging” notion, from
former federal judge Vaughn Walker, see American Law Institute, Coping with COVID: Administering
Jury Trials, Mediations, and Complex Litigation, at 03:55–04:02, https://www.ali.org/news/podcast/
episode/coping-covid-jury-trials-mediations-complex-litigation [https://perma.cc/72KB-84UY].
See SUSSKIND, supra note 60, at 298 (noting that ODR can provide “a bridge, a connection, between
legal understanding and remedy”).
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efficiency and access values as online courts. On one hand, ODR’s
asynchronous and 24/7 nature means it can capture even more efficiencies
than remote proceedings, by making dispute resolution available despite the
work and childcare barriers that can impair the ability of those without
financial wherewithal to participate in online but synchronous
proceedings.138 ODR is also highly scalable, unlike remote formal
proceedings. It overcomes the inelasticity of conventional, court-centered
process that renders much of the American system disproportionate and
unaffordable for many parties with small-dollar claims. On the other hand,
ODR raises “equality of arms” concerns, analogous to traditional court
proceedings where one side has better technology. Some courts have already
set into place basic technological requirements for ODR systems. For
instance, there is consensus that ODR platforms must be compatible with
mobile technologies, which are the sole source of online access for a
nontrivial portion of the population.139 Some courts have gone further,
providing public kiosks clustered in communities with wide digital divides
where disputants can confidentially engage.140
Debate over ODR traffic rules, however, will extend well beyond such
concerns, reigniting deeper, decades-old debates about mandatory, court-
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See Prescott, supra note 116, at 1999-2000 (suggesting ODR enhances access to justice by allowing
disputants to participate in negotiations at any time of day they choose regardless of whether the
other disputant participates at that time); see also Maximilian A. Bulinski & J.J. Prescott, Online Case
Resolution Systems: Enhancing Access, Fairness, Accuracy, and Efficiency, 21 MICH. J. RACE & L. 205, 224,
227 (2016) (reporting suggestive data indicating “that a large fraction of the population would find
it more convenient to address their legal issues at times when courts are closed” and further
describing how business hours–type availability can hamper attempts at “accessing justice”). ODR
also mitigates “system avoidance”—the notion that disputants might avoid courthouses because of
fear of criminal justice contact and the potential to be apprehended for outstanding violations or of
a more diffuse perception that interactions with police and courts are dangerous. Sarah Brayne,
Surveillance and System Avoidance: Criminal Justice Contact and Institutional Attachment, 79 AM. SOC. REV.
367, 371–72 (2014); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1317 (2012)
(suggesting that for petty crimes, convictions are primarily a function of being arrested for the
offense). Online participation may mitigate other psychological barriers: fear of speaking in public,
and shame (a particular concern in debt collection disputes). See Prescott, supra note 116, at 200708 (suggesting that court appearances create anxieties for pro se litigants, especially when the
dispute concerns failure-to-pay warrants). There are also social savings: bringing together the full
panoply of justice system actors—judges, parties, counsel, and others—for in-person proceedings is
costly. See Bulinski & Prescott, supra note 138, at 208–09 (noting this fact).
James E. Cabral, Abhijeet Chavan, Thomas M. Clarke, John Greacen, Bonnie Rose Hough, Linda
Rexer, Jane Ribadeneyra & Richard Zorza, Using Technology to Enhance Access to Justice, 26 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 241, 268–69 (2012).
Id. at 269–70.
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annexed ADR.141 A common concern as ADR proliferated in the 1980s and
1990s was its effect on disadvantaged groups, who often do worse in informal,
less rulebound contexts.142 Co-optation of the system by lawyers—a concern
in adjudicatory systems designed to be accessible to lay litigants143—can
exacerbate these effects.144 So might judges. The last time ADR swept into
court systems, some argued judges were using it to discard undesirable cases,
thus establishing different tiers of justice that operated to restrict, rather than
expand, access to justice among the worst off.145 As with the migration of
formal court proceedings online, one might worry that ODR platforms, sold
as a way to empower those who tend to lose out in the analog litigation
system, will instead slide into a highly efficient, Fordist system for creditors
and landlords to garnish wages and perfect evictions.
But to stop at traffic rules would be to dramatically understate the rule
reckonings that lie ahead as ODR proliferates. For ODR’s more advanced
versions also implicate information rules governing how information is
distributed, exchanged, and utilized. The easiest to see is in the choice of
technique ODR 2.0 uses to prime disputants with information as they
bargain toward settlement. As already noted, some current court-linked
ODR platforms rely on human facilitators to prime disputants with
information, making ODR an asynchronous version of the mediation-based
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Yishai Boyarin, Court-Connected ADR—A Time of Crisis, A Time of Change, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 993,
1007–10 (2012).
See Richard Delgado, Chris Dunn, Pamela Brown, Helena Lee, David Hubbert, Fairness and
Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359, 1360
(1985) (suggesting that informal ADR may lead to more “class-based prejudice”); Trina Grillo, The
Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1549–50 (1991) (concluding that
mandatory mediation for custody disputes can be harmful to disputants because of its implicit
normative standards concerning speaking style and conduct).
See, e.g., Nora Freeman Engstrom, A Dose of Reality for Specialized Courts: Lessons from the VICP, 163 U.
PA. L. REV. 1631, 1713–15 (2015); see also Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S.
305, 324–26 (1985) (observing that “[t]he regular introduction of lawyers” into proceedings can
erode informality and expedience).
Bobbi McAdoo & Nancy A. Welsh, Look Before You Leap and Keep on Looking: Lessons from the
Institutionalization of Court-Connected Mediation, 5 NEV. L.J. 399, 420 (2005). Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-opted or “The Law of ADR”, 19 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 1, 42–44 (1991) (suggesting various reforms to ADR to ensure that it develops while
enhancing trust in the legal system).
See Burbank & Silberman, supra note 24, at 697–98 (noting concerns about creating “different classes
of justice, with disfavored cases shunted to mandatory ADR”). Such concerns persist: a recent study
found an invisible layer of procedures applied by judges that functionally barred many litigants
from getting any kind of a live hearing in court. See Colleen F. Shanahan, The Keys to the Kingdom:
Judges, Pre-Hearing Procedure, and Access to Justice, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 215, 235–36 (2018) (providing
data indicating the proportion of pre-hearing requests granted by judges and suggesting such
requests may serve to inhibit pro se litigants from accessing civil justice).
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ADR systems that have been around since the 1980s. ODR 2.0 alters this
picture by instead using algorithmic add-ons that run the gamut from
relatively simple bidding systems to more advanced outcome-prediction
engines that arm parties with information about their prospects using data
from past disputes within the system.146 Importantly, the choice of
algorithmic technique—and also the more granular, technical choices made
in its construction and finetuning—are plainly procedural in the sense that
they shape the information available to the parties and provide the
framework within which substantive outcomes are pursued. But they also, as
with procedure more generally, can shape substance. ODR 2.0 thus offers a
concrete, procedural illustration of Larry Lessig’s much cited notion that
code is law.147
This core fact about ODR 2.0 drastically complicates procedural debates
about its optimal design and implementation. To begin, ODR 2.0 will raise
the usual debate about the relative capacities of clinical and actuarial
judgment to mitigate and exacerbate human biases that arises in many
algorithmic decision-making contexts. Algorithmic tools, as a long literature
establishes, can be biased or inaccurate compared to human decisionmakers, but they can also perform better on both counts by reducing the
cognitive biases that can afflict human decisions.148 Focusing on this latter,
bias-reducing possibility, ODR’s champions claim it is a panacea, cutting the
Gordion knot that has forever afflicted adjudication by achieving better
efficiency and justice, rather than pursuing one at the expense of the other.149
However, those with technical command of machine learning’s possibilities
and limits know that this will not always be the case.
A second family of concerns raised by ODR 2.0, particularly those that
provide disputants with outcome predictions, echoes another part of the
decades-old debate about mandatory, court-annexed ADR: how directive
should alternative adjudication systems be, and at what cost to procedural
146
147
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149

SUSSKIND, supra note 60, at 159–63; KATSH & RABINOVICH-EINY, supra note 115, at 46–49, 162–
63.
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999). Some ODR evangelists
suggest otherwise and reassure us that ODR 2.0 systems can be “rule-implementing” rather than
“rule-creating.” See SUSSKIND, supra note 60, at 162–63 (asserting that ODR “should be a ruleimplementing and not a rule-creating process” and concluding that “[w]e cannot allow coding to
become law-making”). However, the porousness of the substance-procedure distinction means that
ODR’s more advanced forms most likely will always, to at least some extent, create rather than
merely implement rules.
See Kleinberg et al., supra note 103, at 115 (noting that algorithmic tools can mitigate or exacerbate
bias); KATSH & RABINOVICH-EINY, supra note 115, at 48–51 (same).
KATSH & RABINOVICH-EINY, supra note 115, at 165.
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justice, litigant autonomy and self-determination, and the legitimacy and
remedial flexibility they bring?150
A final concern that is likely to rise to the top of the list as ODR 2.0
proliferates is transparency, for ODR 2.0’s automated outcome predictions
will be deeply embedded in code that is opaque compared to the public
deliberative exercises and written down decisions of the analog court system.
It is, of course, easy to overstate transparency concerns. Judges are black
boxes, too, with reasoning left implicit or ambiguous—not to mention
opinion-less rulings from the bench.151 And yet, the inability of many
advanced algorithmic systems to provide any reasons at all is troubling. One
plausible defense of opacity, though hardly a complete one, begins by noting
that ODR 2.0 collects, uses, and makes available system-level data far beyond
what is generated in analog systems. Data can, in turn, be used to inform
continuous process improvement and even wider reforms, whether in courts
or other branches of government, aimed at preventing disputes from arising
in the first place.152 As Richard Susskind puts it, conventional courts have
always had a high level of “real-time transparency,” but a low level of
“information transparency.”153 ODR 2.0 could flip this state of affairs and
leave us better off than before, so long as the scrutability lost when rules are
embedded in code are offset by gains in more actionable, system-level
information.154
150

151

152

153
154

Boyarin, supra note 141, at 1007–10. Closely related are anxieties about ODR 2.0’s potential to
shrink available sources of information and counsel within the system. As noted previously, legal
tech is hatching numerous other non-state sources of information and guidance: websites, chatbots
and other QA (or “question and answer”) systems, livechats, webcasts, document construction
services, text message reminders, and more. See SUSSKIND, supra note 60, at 107 (describing
“systems and services” under the “heading of ‘public legal education’ or ‘legal empowerment . . .’”).
But ODR 2.0 threatens to crowd out these more pluralistic sources of counsel and raises a concern,
sounding in political theory, about any one source of case-critical information, particularly a statecreated one, coming to dominate.
See Rebecca Crootof, “Cyborg Justice” and the Risk of Technological-Legal Lock-in, 119 COLUM. L. REV.
F. 233, 238 (2019) (noting that “both human and AI judges may be black boxes”); Eugene Volokh,
Chief Justice Robots, 68 DUKE L.J. 1135, 1187 n.154 (2019) (“[I]t is hard to see why we should prefer
the inscrutable silicon-based AI judge black box to the equally inscrutable carbon-based human
judge black box.”).
See SUSSKIND, supra note 60, at 194 (calling for “visibility over . . . data about the throughput and
volumes of cases, their subject matter and value . . .”); see also Rebecca A. Johnson & Tanina
Rostain, Tool for Surveillance or Spotlight on Inequality? Big Data and the Law, 16 ANN. REV. L. & SOC.
SCI. 453, 466 (2020) (noting use of big data and computational harms to predict harms, potentially
obviating the need for legal process).
SUSSKIND, supra note 60, at 194.
Id. at 199 (suggesting that increases in “information transparency” might offset reductions in “realtime transparency”). For a jurisprudential version of the argument, see Brian Sheppard, Warming Up
to Inscrutability: How Technology Could Challenge Our Concept of Law, 68 U. TORONTO L.J. 36, 40–43
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The billion dollar question for ODR, as with online courts or lawyerdriven legal tech tools, is once more who gets to decide the mix of rules, both
traffic and information, that will govern the new systems. Here, the
complexity of the efficiency and access trade-offs presented by ODR raises
all the same traffic-related questions about the optimal mix of party control,
judicial discretion, and per se rules as does the online migration of formal
legal proceedings. But the information that ODR systems generate lead to a
wrinkle: traffic rules could themselves be automated. That is, decisions about
which litigants are pushed into ODR, or which among multiple ODR
systems they are pushed to, could be given over to machines wielding
predictive analytics.155
That is just the beginning of ODR’s potentially radical implications for
American procedure, for the demands of devising rules for new ODR
platforms—particularly their information-priming algorithmic components—
fit awkwardly with past ways of American procedure-making and strongly
suggest the need for entirely new approaches. Judicial discretion might do
when it comes to refashioning proportionality or the work product doctrine as
new legal tech tools come into the system. But it seems positively unwise to
leave ODR 2.0’s design and implementation to court-only administration. Nor
does the design and oversight of ODR 2.0 fit well with the rulemaking process,
at least in its typical ex ante and drawn out forms. Instead, ODR 2.0 will
require something closer to ongoing, multistakeholder oversight via a process
that brings together judges, lawyers, technologists, and key stakeholders to
develop, finetune, monitor, amend, and, where necessary, decommission
ODR systems. Continuous oversight, not case-level judicial exercise of
discretion or ex ante specification of rules by rulemakers, would seem to be the
order of the day.

155

(2018). A nice way to capture all of this is to note that ODR is a system rather than a mere tool. KATSH
& RABINOVICH-EINY, supra note 115, at 35, 52 (noting how ODR “lift[s] the onus” of obtaining
justice from individual to entity); id. at 163 (“As courts increasingly rely on digital technology and
ODR systems, they will learn to view data as a central feature in dispute resolution.”).
SUSSKIND, supra note 60, at 239 (noting the possibility that an algorithmic system “could allocate
hard cases to the traditional court without any human analysis and intervention and could do so to
a higher standard than case officers and judges . . .”). Mass adjudicatory agencies like the Social
Security Administration have already experimented with triage tools to push certain disability
benefits cases—for instance, “easy grants”—into an alternative, staff-overseen process rather than
a full-dress proceeding before an administrative judge. See DAVID FREEMAN ENGSTROM, DANIEL
E. HO, CATHERINE M. SHARKEY & MARIANO-FLORENTINO CUÉLLAR, GOVERNMENT BY
ALGORITHM: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 83 (2020)
(“The SSA’s tool for clustering like cases, for instance, potentially enables adjudicators to work
through cases more quickly and more equitably, improving the consistency of decision making.”).
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Much work remains to be done to specify what a new multistakeholder
design and governance scheme could or should look like. One might start by
examining the various bodies, among them state access to justice
commissions, that have pioneered new approaches to adjudication and
access to justice in recent decades, from pro se court forms and self-help
centers to court navigator programs and limited scope lawyer and nonlawyer
assistance programs.156 More recent examples can be found in the rapid
construction of online “diversion programs” by many state courts during the
COVID-19 pandemic to handle a crush of eviction and consumer debt
cases.157 And a few states are experimenting with or exploring a “regulatory
sandbox” approach to welcome new legal services providers into the system,
including software.158 Each of these approaches will require careful study to
understand which holds the most promise for the governance and oversight
of ODR systems. Only then can smart “who decides” decisions be made.
What is clear is that even the best-designed governance scheme will raise
many of the same anxieties that plagued the past several decades of
rulemaking. Questions will arise about the system’s capacity to make
empirically informed judgments about the effects of design choices. The
process of system design and governance will also surely reflect the doubleedged sword of public ventilation of the rulemaking process. Perhaps a
modified, multistakeholder rulemaking process will be up to the task of
setting into place sensibly designed ODR systems that balance competing
values. After all, court innovation in response to the pandemic has, by most
accounts, gone smoothly. However, not nearly enough time has passed, or
156

157

158

This was also true of the various state-level access to justice commissions that various state supreme
courts created and charged with crafting responses to the pro se crisis. For more on state access to
justice commissions, see Access to Justice Commissions, A.B.A., https://www.americanbar.org/
groups/legal_aid_indigent_defense/resource_center_for_access_to_justice/atj-commissions
[https://perma.cc/8H2K-UP7P]; Justice for All, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., https:/
/www.ncsc.org/jfa [https://perma.cc/9YWQ-8TD5].
For an example of a state-level program, see Mich. Sup. Ct., Priority Treatment and New Procedure for
Landlord/Tenant Cases, Administrative Order No. 2020-17 (2020), https://courts.michigan.gov/Courts/
MichiganSupremeCourt/rules/court-rules-admin-matters/Administrative%20Orders/2020-08_2020-0609_FormattedOrder_AO2020-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/53GN-FC4Q]. For a local-level example, see
PINELLAS EVICTION DIVERSION PROGRAM, https://pinellasevictiondiversion.org/[https://perma.cc/
XCX4-7Y3C].
See, e.g., What We Do, OFF. OF LEGAL SERVS. INNOVATION, https://utahinnovationoffice.org/about/
what-we-do [https://perma.cc/34DW-LSAA] (providing details on Utah’s sandbox pilot, including
what amounts to a regulatory agency as a gatekeeper for entry into the new, experimental system under
relaxed legal practice rules); see also Closing the Justice Gap Working Group, STATE BAR OF CAL.,
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/About-Us/Who-We-Are/Committees/Closing-the-Justice-Gap-WorkingGroup [https://perma.cc/25Q9-8JGQ] (describing a group appointed to consider a sandbox approach
to spur innovation in legal services delivery).
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studies done, to understand its contours, and nor can we be confident that
postpandemic political realities will be the same. Instead, it is not hard to
imagine that ODR’s post-pandemic career will fuel a further politicization of
procedure beyond even what we have seen in recent decades, with ODR
platforms designed to resolve consumer debt or eviction cases quickly
devolving into a politically charged extension of an often dysfunctional social
welfare politics. The ability of American procedure-making to manage that
kind of conflict in the past does not inspire confidence. But the ability of the
American legal system to modulate legal tech’s coming will depend on it, and
we should hope that it can.
III. THE WAY FORWARD: A DIGITAL RESEARCH AGENDA
Part II sketched a set of rule reckonings that lie ahead as new digital
technologies make their way to the center of the civil justice system. Some
questions remain: what role might civil procedure scholars play in helping
judges and rulemakers navigate that process? And, to return to where we
began, what does Professor Burbank’s masterful body of scholarship teach us
about how to go about that work? There is not time here to lay out a full-scale
research agenda. But Professor Burbank’s efforts to surface the key tensions
that have defined the past century of American procedure can help us to
glimpse a range of critically important roles for legal scholars, and for
proceduralists in particular, as the American civil justice system moves into the
digital future. This concluding Part offers some brief observations about each.
Perhaps the easiest role to see is the one that procedural scholars,
including Professor Burbank, have always played: scholars must surface and
analyze competing rule choices and deconstruct the efficiency, access,
distributive, and other trade-offs raised by each. Some of this work will come
in the form of conventional but vitally important scholarship analogizing new
digitized procedural challenges to past procedural debates. As just one
example, we might seek to understand traffic rules for moving litigants into
and out of new virtual fora by reference to past debates over the
enforceability of forum selection agreements and concerns about forum
shopping.
Yet litigation’s digitization will also inaugurate a new era of empirical
legal studies by raising crucial questions about the effects of rule choices while
simultaneously creating vast new troves of data with which to answer them.
More than ever, the onus will be on civil procedure scholars—a Fourth
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Estate of the procedural realm—to help judges exercise their considerable
discretion and navigate the shoals of a newly digitized civil justice system.
To perform that role well, proceduralists must, as Professor Burbank once
put it, “find out the facts, in particular the facts about discretionary
justice.”159 But judicial discretion’s effects is only one type of empirical
question to be answered. What, precisely, is gained and lost in the migration
of formal court proceedings online? If the online migration is left up to party
consent, how much will strategic bargaining, with litigation’s haves using
migration as a bargaining chip against cost-conscious adversaries, shape
access and outcomes? And when might per se rules be the better choice?
Turning to lawyer-driven legal tech tools, just how great are the litigation
advantages conferred by potent new applications, from e-discovery to legal
analytics to outcome prediction, whether in choosing a forum, battling over
discovery, or negotiating toward settlement? Might the systemic gains from
better information, however unevenly distributed, exceed the distributive
costs? Finally, there’s ODR: how do different modes of ODR, from ODR
1.0’s virtual gathering places to ODR 2.0’s BATNA-generating outcome
engines, shape settlement outcomes? Is ODR 2.0 worth the candle? Might
cost, not information, be the sticking point in the run of minor but
systemically significant cases that ODR currently targets? And how to keep
the problems that have afflicted ADR from afflicting ODR?
Exploiting new streams of data to answer these and other questions,
however, will not be easy. Selection bias, the bane of procedure empiricism,
will once more loom large when connecting traffic rules to case outcomes.
Without controlled and randomized experiments, true causal inference will
be elusive. In addition to these standard methodological challenges, the
online migration will yield a vast trove of new data, including digitized
courtroom footage, that will provide a ground-level look at litigation that
could previously be achieved only by amassing written transcripts or doing
resource-intensive observational work in local courthouses. The difficulty of
these latter tasks may explain why we know so little about state and local
courts,160 and why the few procedure scholars who bother to do resourceand time-intensive observational work generate such eye-popping insights.161
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160
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Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure, supra note 4, at 1940.
See, e.g., Justin Weinstein-Tull, The Structures of Local Courts, 106 VA. L. REV. 1031, 1034 (2020)
(“[D]espite the place of local courts at the heart of the justice system . . . , we know very little
about them.”).
See, e.g., Jessica E. Steinberg, Anna E. Carpenter, Colleen F. Shanahan, & Alyx Mark, Judges and the
Deregulation of Lawyer’s Monopoly, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 1315, 1316 (2021) (showing how judges have
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But video transcripts will also require new methods, including some of the
same machine learning techniques that are powering new legal tech tools, to
interrogate the new mass of digitized data with any rigor. Professor
Burbank’s turn, well into his career, to rigorous, hard-edged empiricism can
serve as a model of the methodological innovation that will be necessary to
fully exploit the empirical fruits of a digitizing litigation system.
A second broad role for procedure scholars relates to the datafication that
digitization will bring: proceduralists can and must advocate for access to
data, not merely as fuel for scholarly evaluation and validation of rule choices
of the sort that Professor Burbank has long called for, but also as an
increasingly central determinant of access to justice. Legal tech tools can only
be as good as the data that power them. “Garbage in, garbage out”—a
mantra among algorithmic critics of all stripes—is no less applicable to legal
tech tools. A key implication, and the subject of an emerging “open court
data” movement, is that the decisions that judges, chief judges, and court
administrators make about data accessibility and infrastructure will shape the
innovation ecosystem and, by extension, help determine whether new legal
technologies serve all or only a privileged few. Though our constitutions,
statutes, and rules are dotted with “open court” provisions, court data has
long been some of the most closely held government data and some of the
hardest to dislodge. Charlotte Alexander, who is also one of the leaders of
the “open court data” movement just noted, puts it best: court records, from
the federal level on down, sit behind a “wall of cash and kludge.”162 This
combination of clunky user interfaces and paywalls place court records,
especially the bulk downloads needed to build potent legal tech applications,
beyond the reach of all but the most well-heeled law firms and tech
companies.163 There are, to be sure, privacy concerns that must be
addressed.164 But finding a way to make court data more accessible is critical.
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163

164

sought to manage the pro se crisis via a de facto deregulation of the legal services industry by actively
facilitating a “shadow network” of nonlawyer legal services providers in local courtrooms).
See Charlotte S. Alexander & Mohammad Javad Feizollahi, On Dragons, Caves, Teeth, and Claws:
Legal Analytics and the Problem of Court Data Access, in COMPUTATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES: THE
PROMISE AND CHALLENGE OF DATA-DRIVEN LEGAL RESEARCH 95, 97 (Ryan Whalen ed.,
2020).
Importantly, paywalls may get worse: state courts have digitized during the pandemic, embracing
e-filing like never before. But COVID has also created powerful budgetary pressures that will be
felt for decades, particularly at the state and local level. These pressures will in turn provide
powerful incentives for courts to monetize their newly digitized records.
Scholars have only just begun to catalog the types of the sensitive information contained in court
records, chief among them locational, identity, health, and financial information as well as past
involvement in criminal or civil proceedings. David S. Ardia & Anne Klinefelter, Privacy and Court
Records: An Empirical Study, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1807, 1817 (2015). Some are predictable and
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As legal tech tools move to the center of American litigation, access to data
will increasingly determine access to justice. Procedural scholars must show
how and why that is true.
A third and final role for procedure scholars is more diffuse but perhaps
most important of all. Just as Professor Burbank’s scholarly work has so often
done, procedure scholars must strive to be the conscience of the system. The
most important way proceduralists can serve in this role is by self-consciously
serving as the principal, and a principled, line of defense against both over
and underreliance on new legal technologies.
Overreliance is the more commonly voiced concern these days given a
growing anti-tech zeitgeist.165 And with good reason. Technological change

165

perhaps even relatively benign in the grand scheme of surveillance capitalism—for instance, the use of
divorce records to market fitness services to newly single women. See Karen Gottlieb, Using Court Record
Information for Marketing in the United States: It’s Public Information, What’s the Problem?, PRIVACY RIGHTS
CLEARINGHOUSE (Feb. 1, 2004), https://privacyrights.org/resources/using-court-recordinformation-marketing-united-states-its-public-information-whats [https://perma.cc/4CZR-ZSYR].
But others skirt or even cross lines. Civil court records are being used in pre-employment screenings
and consumer credit determinations, and they could plausibly be used by insurance companies.
Michael Klazema, What is Returned in a Civil History Background Check?, BACKGROUNDCHECKS.COM
(Dec. 28, 2018), https://www.backgroundchecks.com/community/Post/5882/What-is-Returnedin-a-Civil-History-Background-Check [https://perma.cc/KMQ5-4D5A]; see also CHECKR
https://checkr.com [https://perma.cc/VQ44-5JN8] (aspiring to “build a fairer future by breaking
down the stigmas around hiring people with criminal records”). An especially discomfiting example
comes from reports that a NYC landlord association scraped housing court records to create a blacklist
of renters who had the gall to try to vindicate their rights in housing court and should not be rented to.
See Emily Myers, What is the Tenant Blacklist and How Serious Is Being on It?, BRICK UNDERGROUND (Oct.
19, 2020, 12:30 PM), https://www.brickunderground.com/blog/2014/05/tenant_blacklist [https://
perma.cc/SG9Y-2JDG] (describing a tenant blacklist that is provided to landlords who are vetting
tenants during the rental application process); Kim Barker & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, On Tenant
Blacklist, Errors and Renters With Little Recourse, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/17/nyregion/new-york-housing-tenant-blacklist.html
[https://perma.cc/6M7E-FAKB] (outlining how prospective landlords use the tenant blacklist to
“weed out risky tenants”); Ronda Kaysen, How to Escape the Dreaded ‘Tenant Blacklist’, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/13/realestate/how-to-escape-the-dreaded-tenantblacklist.html [https://perma.cc/ES58-Y73Y] (“There are hundreds of tenant screening bureaus,
collecting names from courthouses around the country and selling the information to landlords.”).
FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL
MONEY AND INFORMATION 3 (2016) (“The law, so aggressively protective of secrecy in the world
of commerce, is increasingly silent when it comes to the privacy of persons.”); VIRGINIA EUBANKS,
AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE
POOR 11 (2018) (“[P]oor and working-class people are targeted by new tools of digital poverty
management and face life-threatening consequences as a result.”); CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF
MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY
13 (2016) (exploring harmful examples of mathematical models that “affect people at critical life
moments”); SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A
HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER 17 (2019) (“Surveillance capitalism is not an
accident of overzealous technologists, but rather a rouge capitalism that learned to cunningly
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can move too quickly and sweep too broadly, bringing efficiencies that are
hard to resist while subverting less quantifiable process values or clear-eyed
assessments of what else is lost in the process. As Norm Spaulding has pointed
out, the downsides of transformative innovations, and even the alternatives
that were available at their adoption, are often swept under the rug or lost to
history once path dependence and the leverage of market dominance sets
in.166 This concern might prove especially acute for legal technologies
designed to supplant a litigation system that has drawn such intense criticism,
only some of it earned, about excessive cost, delay, and adversarialism. We
must continually ask what digitization—whether online migration of court
proceedings, automated delivery of legal services, or ODR 2.0—will increase
access to. We must ask, in other words, what kind of justice, and what kind of
legal subject, they will combine to deliver.167 Only by continually asking these
questions can proceduralists guard against the risk that digital’s scalability
will lead to rapid adoption but an impoverished, gutter system of justice in
which the business case, with its emphasis on efficiency and cost reduction,
wins out over the sociotechnical or moral case for or against a new approach.
While overreliance is likely to be the more commonly voiced concern, the
risk of underreliance on potentially transformative legal technologies is also
real, particularly in a system built upon judicial discretion. Lawyers are
cautious Burkeans at heart. We are trained to be hand-wringers, to see
around corners, and to come up with reasons not to do things. But if lawyers
are professionally disposed against automation, then judges are even more
so. A striking illustration is France, which recently banned judge-level
analytics outright after judges rose up against a law that made court data
broadly available to the public.168
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exploit its historical conditions to ensure and defend its success.”). For a measured rejoinder, see
Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar & Aziz Z. Huq, Economies of Surveillance, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1280,
1283–85 (2020) (reviewing SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE
FIGHT FOR A HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER (2019)).
Norman W. Spaulding, Online Dispute Resolution and the End of Adversarial Justice?, in LEGAL TECH AND
THE FUTURE OF CIVIL JUSTICE, supra note 68.
Id.
See Michael Livermore & Dan Rockmore, France Kicks Data Scientists Out of Its Courts, SLATE (June
21, 2019, 7:30 AM) https://slate.com/technology/2019/06/france-has-banned-judicial-analyticsto-analyze-the-courts.html [https://perma.cc/UW95-FF2K] (making “judicial analytics” illegal);
Jason Tashea, France Bans Publishing of Judicial Analytics and Prompts Criminal Penalty, A.B.A. J. (June 7,
2019, 12:51 PM) https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/france-bans-and-creates-criminalpenalty-for-judicial-analytics [https://perma.cc/V73R-A5XE] (banning publication of judicial
analytics).
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There is, of course, little indication that the U.S. system, with its very
different common law commitments and comfort with judicial policymaking,
will go the way of France. Still, at the highest precincts of our legal system,
judge sentiment might be moving in a similar direction. Consider this
progression: Justice Holmes, in his iconic The Path of the Law, wrote in 1897:
“For the rational study of the law, the black-letter man may be the man of
the present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics and the master
of economics.”169 Exactly fifty years later, Justice Douglas sounded a much
sourer note: “The law is not a series of calculating machines where definitions
and answers come tumbling out when the right levers are pushed.”170 Fast
forward another seventy years to the present-day and Chief Justice Roberts,
who observed in a speech that technology “is putting significant strain on
how the judiciary goes about doing things.”171 Soon after, he warned:
“Beware the robots . . . . My worry is not that machines will start thinking
like us. I worry that we will start thinking like machines.”172
These are just outtakes. They do not necessarily reflect underlying trends
in judicial thinking. But talk to virtually any judge about the coming of legal
tech, and you will find at least some reason to worry that reflexive judicial
opposition to innovations could stymie salutary legal technologies from ever
seeing the light of day. Knee-jerk opposition could exacerbate distributive
concerns as TAR disputes mount and as courts, climbing out from the
COVID-19 pandemic, face the question of which parts of the system to
move—or keep—online, or which pandemic era “diversion” programs
should be built out into full-fledged ODR systems. Worse, large companies
will continue to develop potent tools to gain a litigation advantage. So will
landlords, who already have the help of a growing menu of “proptech” tools
to automate evictions.173 But judicial aversion to new innovations, from
169
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Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
William O. Douglas, The Dissent: A Safeguard of Democracy, 32 J. AM. JUD. SOC’Y 104, 105 (1948).
See Adam Liptak, Sent to Prison by a Software Program’s Secret Algorithms, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/01/us/politics/sent-to-prison-by-a-software-programssecret-algorithms.html [https://perma.cc/U29M-KENM].
Debra Cassens Weiss, ‘Beware the Robots,’ Chief Justice Tells High School Graduates, ABA J. (June 8, 2018,
4:10
PM),
https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/beware_the_robots_
chief_justice_tells_high_school_graduates [https://perma.cc/35JL-NE2R]. Chief Justice Roberts
also noted in his 2014 Year-End Report: “[T]he courts will often choose to be late to the harvest of
American ingenuity. Courts are simply different in important respects when it comes to adopting
technology, including information technology.” CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS, 2014 YEAR-END
REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 3 (2014), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/yearend/2014year-endreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/477H-BXLN].
Erin Mcelroy, Meredith Whittaker & Genevieve Fried, COVID-19 Crisis Capitalism Comes to Real
Estate, BOSTON REV. (May 7, 2020), https://bostonreview.net/class-inequality-science-
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online proceedings to ODR 2.0, could stall tech innovation designed to
narrow the justice gap, leaving only legal tech applications that widen it.
There are, in short, profound risks and rewards on all sides. Managing
those risks, and realizing those rewards, will require a rich mix of oldfashioned thinking about procedural rules, a heavy dose of methodological
innovation, and clear-eyed thinking at all levels of abstraction about what
type of civil justice system we want to build as new technologies sweep into
it. Proceduralists have always been some of the best-positioned to do that
kind of thinking because they already work back and forth between
transcendental ideals and the messy realities that cabin the possibilities that
can feasibly emerge but may still be better than the status quo.174 As the next
generation of procedural scholars confronts these challenges and helps
decision-makers to do the same, there is no better model than Professor
Burbank’s rigorous, methodologically eclectic, and farseeing scholarship.
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nature/erin-mcelroy-meredith-whittaker-genevieve-fried-covid-19-crisis
[https://perma.cc/7PN8-ZH6W].
See SUSSKIND, supra note 60, at 88 (comparing “a comparative [versus] a transcendental framework for
the analysis and pursuit of justice.”).

